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ANALYTICAL PRINCIPLE: A GUIDE FOR LAPSE,
SURVIVORSHIP, DEATH WITHOUT ISSUE, AND THE RULE
Raymond C. O'Brien*
INTRODUCTION
Bertrand Russell once defined pure mathematics as "a science in
which we never know what we are talking about nor whether what we
are talking about is true."' This simple statement captures the problem
in estates and the legal future interests through which we dispose of
wealth 2 today. The development of future interests which speaks of
lapse, survivorship, death without issue, and the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities (the Rule) is also so conditioned by history that nearly all of the
major treatises on the subject begin any explanation with the year 1066
A.D. and the Norman Conquest of England.' Sadly enough, the aver-
age student or scrivener has neither interest nor time for such depth,4
* B.A., La Salle College; J.D., University of Virginia; M.Ch.A., D.Min., The Catholic Uni-
versity of America; Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America; Visiting
Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center; Roman Catholic Priest, Archdiocese of
Washington.
1. A. Gulliver, Future Interests, Cases and Materials 2 (1959) [hereinafter Gulliver, Future
Interests] (quoting Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean Legal Thinking, 17 Cornell
L.Q. 568, 575 (1932), quoting without citation Bertrand Russell).
2. Wealth today has passed from land into the equity market, stocks, bonds, money markets,
certificates of deposit, and mutual funds. Passing from an agrarian to an industrial economy has
changed the nature of wealth and the tools through which it may be controlled or conveyed. To
date, "the vocabulary, definitions, and classifications of the historical land law have been applied
to the modern equitable future interests in securities." T. Bergin & P. Haskell, Preface to Estates
in Land and Future Interests 122 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter Bergin & Haskell, Preface to Es-
tates]. It remains to be seen if newer formulations, like the Uniform Probate Code, will break with
history and adopt fresh approaches to control and conveyance. One fact is certain, the new man-
ner of possessing wealth is here to stay.
3. See L.M. Simes, Law of Future Interests (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter Simes, Future Inter-
ests]; Scales & Hallback, Problems and Materials on Decedents' Estates and Trusts (2d ed.
1973); Haskell, Preface to the Law of Trusts (1975); Bergin & Haskell, Preface to Estates, supra
note 2.
4. The progression of legal future interests has burdened the student and the scrivener with
an information explosion. For instance, essential knowledge for the administration and drafting of
trusts include:
(I) recent changes in estate and gift tax laws, specifically, and the myriad federal and local
taxes affecting wealth generally;
(2) Prudent Person rule and its evaluation through ERISA;
(3) The Uniform Probate Code;
(4) The Restatement of Conflict of Laws;
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no matter what the benefit. Thus, as Bertrand Russell correctly ob-
serves, "we never know exactly what we are talking about." This is a
problem.
As the scrivener often confuses what he is saying, so too does the
truth of the settlor's intention become lost. Thus, another observation
can be made, another question asked: Whether what we are talking
about is true? Often it is not. When the inaccuracy of the scrivener is
complemented by the cryptic intentions of the settlor, neither the bene-
ficiary nor the trustee can proceed without the aid of Solomon.
There is no substitute for the historical significance of words or
phrases5 nor for the appreciation of what these mean in transmission of
wealth through trusts. It is the purpose of this article to develop an
analytical principle-meaning a logical approach-by which we can
predict, explain, and even modify the often absent or bizarre intention
of any settlor, donor, or scrivener. This intention includes future inter-
ests passing through lapse, express and implied conditions of survivor-
ship, death without issue, and the Rule. These four subjects are treated
as constant and yet are among the most complicated non-tax related
issues of trusts and estates. Applying an analytical principle to them is
meant to offer a concrete basis upon which the scrivener and the settlor
can add related issues, ones that interest and complement the four dis-
cussed in this article.
Related issues to the four mentioned are ademption, exoneration,
inter vivos accessions, post-mortem changes, and the use of class de-
scriptions or powers of appointment as they relate to the intent of the
creator of any interest. Each of these is always described in extensive
detail. Students can recite individual cases concerning each. But as one
author has observed, "The case method unadulterated is an unsatisfac-
tory and frustrating modus operandi for all concerned." 6 Individual
cases do not easily provide analytical consistency among all. This arti-
cle is an attempt to present four constant major issues and the tandem
ones mentioned, in a lineal scheme that will demonstrate their interde-
pendence. Only by a principle through which we can demonstrate inter-
dependence can we arrive at the essence: the intent of the scrivener's
client.
(5) The possibility of international administration of estates.
5. See Gulliver, Future Interests, supra note I, at 2. "Future interests is out of this world
and yet it's in it. In terms of the formulation of currently operating doctrine, the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries are but as yesterday." Id.
6. Id. at 3.
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This then is not another article about lapse, survivorship, death
without issue, and the Rule. It is the involvement of these four-and
more-in an original and creative analytical principle through which
the practitioner can interpret the intent of the creator of any instru-
ment, inter vivos or testamentary. This is its practical approach. Then,
as is so often the case, either from the four corners of the instrument or
from parol evidence, when the attorney cannot discover the intent of
the creator, he or she can predict-using a lineal scheme-what most
approximates intent. This is especially so when utilizing modern legisla-
tive or judicial aids such as substantial compliance to legislative enact-
ments of Wait and See, Second Look, or Cy Pres. There is clearly a
desire to provide greater certainty and equity in finding intent.
The analytical principle (the Principle) is presented as a scheme, a
diagram, a developing tool. While it has been described in segments,
this article remains a description of the interdependence of lapse, ex-
press and implied conditions of survivorship, death without issue, and
the Rule.
I. THE LINEAL SCHEME ITSELF
One of the oldest adages concerning a last will and testament is
that it is ambulatory. 7 There is a time element captured in this adage.
It represents the passage of time from the execution of the instrument
through the death of the testator and beyond in some cases, to the hap-
pening of an event some time distant yet commanded by the will. The
Principle adopts this lineal progression as part of the scheme. It is a
time line represented horizontally. This line, moving from left to right,
is then divided into four separate areas by means of three vertical lines
intersecting the single horizontal one.
Each of these three vertical lines represents a particular point in
time and each is identified according to the simple designations of A,
B, and C. The precise identification and utilization of each is impor-
tant, for each marks a distinctive point in a testator's expressed or pre-
sumed intent.
Line A is that point which marks the creation of the instrument.8
7. See generally Thomas E. Atkinson, Handbook of the Law of Wills (2d ed. 1953). The
ambulatory character of the will allows for changes in its contents from the time it is executed.
From this results the doctrine of independent significance. Today, we can appreciate the Uniform
Probate Code "Legal List" provision as a more precise capture of ambulatory character. U.P.C. §
2-513 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
8. In a testamentary instrument, line A is the execution of the last will and testament. In an
1988]
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Line B is the death of the testator and line C the happening of an event
or a condition. Thus, each line, intersecting the horizontal progression
of time, is important. It would be disastrous to the intent of the testator
and to the heirs or beneficiaries to stand at an incorrect line and ask:
"Is there any possibility that any interest will not vest within a life in
being plus twenty-one years?" 9 In an inter vivos trust, one would make
a grave error by relying upon a measuring life alive at the death of the
settlor, but not alive at the creation of the trust instrument. The lineal
scheme provides fixed and identifiable points, reducing error and al-
lowing greater prediction.
Certainty of prediction10 is the objective of the lineal scheme. Line
A evidences an intent to create an interest. This would constitute deliv-
ery" in an inter vivos trust or due execution of a valid last will and
testament by a competent person in a testamentary trust. Volumes have
been written concerning the importance of this particular point in time
in the lineal progression of a trust. 2 Such import is recognized in the
lineal scheme as line A.
Line B is the effective date of the testamentary transaction. The
inter vivos trust has already been announced at line A, perhaps only to
be funded in a pour over arrangement at line B. But for the testamen-
tary dispositive plan sanctioned by the local testate statutes, this is the
commencement of announced intent. The will speaks. This is not to say
that between Line A and B, from the creation to the effective date of
inter vivos transaction, line A marks creation of the interest.
9. See infra part V of text (discussion of Rule Against Perpetuities).
10. George Eliot once remarked that prophecy is the most gratuitous form of error. Likewise,
persons inquiring as to intent-even their own-are always subject to error. Nonetheless, legisla-
tures and judiciaries have sought intent in such statutes as pretermitted heir, see U.P.C. § 2-302
(1982 & Supp. 1983); anti-lapse, see id. § 2-605; revocation by operation of law or changed
circumstances, see id. § 2-508; or even intestate statutes of distribution, see id. §§ 2-101 to -114.
For examples of judicial presumptions of undue influence, see In re Estate of Simmons, 156 Minn.
144, 194 N.W. 330 (1923), and In re Estate of Novotny, 385 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. App. 1986).
For examples of the weight given to the use of an attestation clause, and accordingly serving as
predictive tools, see Norton v. Goodwine, 310 Ill. 490, 142 N.E. 171 (1923), and In re Estate of
Krausman, 131 Ill. App. 2d 514, 268 N.E.2d 505 (1971). Use of the lineal scheme is an additional
tool seeking certainty of prediction.
II. Inter vivos creation of a trust is often difficult to distinguish from other relationships in
which property is to be managed for another. Delivery or any other act necessary for creation of
the trust must first be proven by the party asserting the existence of a trust before the lineal
scheme may be used. Russell v. Fish, 149 Wis. 122, 135 N.W. 531 (1912). Likewise, a valid last
will and testament must exist before a testamentary trust is operative, although such a written
instrument may evidence a pre-existing trust. Lail v. Lail, 281 P.2d 885 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1955); Hiss v. Hiss, 228 Ill. 414, 81 N.E. 1056 (1907).
12. See, e.g.. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953).
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the instrument, nothing happened. For instance, the majority of the
anti-lapse statutes have operated during this period of time. Yet, it is to
say that with line B another substantive period commences and it is
familiar to estates, that is administration,"3 post-mortem changes.
Administration of the decedent's estate can thus begin the opera-
tion of a testamentary trust announced in a valid last will and testa-
ment. Or it can mean the added deposit of trust property' 4 in a more
comprehensive estate plan.'" One definite characteristic of the B line is
that it marks the death of the inter vivos settlor or the death of the
testator/creator. The testamentary trust instrument is now operative
and being administered by the trustee.
The final line, the C line, identifies the happening of an event, a
condition, a date. Like the A line, the intent of the creator of the trust
is important as the trustee and the probate courts must be able to posit
when the trust came into existence and when it is to terminate. Line C
is often the termination of a trust, but it is always the last point at
which we can have vesting under the Rule.' 6 It is an excellent place to
look for causal connection with the best measuring life.
Line C will often be the death of a life tenant, the occasion of a
timely change, age, or condition. It could be a series of conditions, a
13. In trust administration there is a difference between inter vivos and testamentary trusts.
As is readily seen, an inter vivos trust is in existence at line A, during the lifetime of the creator.
Not true with a testamentary trust. Some states make great distinctions between the two trusts,
extending probate court control over decedents' estates to the testamentary trustees. The Uniform
Probate Code recommends elimination of the procedural distinctions between testamentary and
inter vivos trusts. See U.P.C. §§ 7-101 to -301 (1982 & Supp. 1983). The rationale behind the
Code's suggestion is the familar one of speed and efficiency of administration. Both proper admin-
istration and the Code thus advocate that testamentary trusts be treated like inter vivos ones: no
administration.
14. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 74-88 (Supp. 1967) (for the necessity of property
as the subject matter of the trust).
15. Once the subject of the trust has been established during the settlor's lifetime, payment
of additional assets into the trust from a valid will is called a pour over. U.P.C. § 2-511 (1982)
provides for this by incorporating § I of the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act, 8A
U.L.A. 599 (1983). The Code approves a broad range of pour over devices. There are more tradi-
tional state approaches related to incorporation by reference or description of an ambiguity in the
last will and testament. See Mastin v. First Nat'l Bank, 278 Ala. 251, 177 So. 2d 808 (1965);
Gibson v. Jones, 293 Ala. 616, 308 So. 2d 692 (1975). Of course, should the creator of the inter
vivos trust revoke it or should it terminate, any testamentary pour over would lapse.
16. Trusts often contain many contingencies, but with regard to the Rule the primary con-
cern is that particular future interest which hinders the power of alienation. Having all these
interests-C lines---occur within the life in being at the A line (inter vivos) or the B line (testa-
mentary) is the purpose of the Rule. I Scott, Trusts § 62.10 (2d ed. 1956); 5A R. Powell & P.
Rohan, Real Property § 759 (1987); L.M. Simes & A.F. Smith, The Law of Future Interests §
1391 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter Simes & Smith, Future Interests].
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multiplicity of events intended by the settlor upon which interests
would vest and disbursement begin. For purposes of analyzing the four
issues of lapse, survivorship, death without issue, or the Rule, this is a
crucial point. It is here that the settlor relinquishes contact. Whether
we conclude vesting, exercise the rule of administrative convenience,
exercise a power of appointment, or simply distribute principal, this is
the final point in a settlor's dispositive plan. Contingencies become con-
clusions here.
There are thus three distinctive points along a spa-
tial-ambulatory line. Running from left to right they are: the A line
as starting point; the B line as the effective date of the testamentary
instrument; and the C line, the occasion of an event or a condition. It is
at each of these points that one can find perspective in seeking to iden-
tify the intent of a settlor, or predict what that intent could possibly
have been.
Now we add another element: distinctive time frames. Before and
after each lineal event there is a space of time in which changes among
persons are likely to have occurred. Prior to line A, time frame 1 repre-
sents events prior to the creation of the intent of the settlor. Thus, in an
inter vivos execution, it is those changes among persons before delivery
or execution of an inter vivos trust. In a testamentary execution, time
frame 1 encompasses those changes among persons named in the last
will and testament executed at line A, but perhaps not represented cor-
rectly in this executed instrument- For instance, the will executed at
line A could bequeath property to a legatee already deceased. The lega-
tee would have predeceased both the testator and the execution of the
will. Perhaps his or her legacy will have lapsed. 17 Time frame 1 does
contain a space along the lineal scheme which offers factors affecting
intent and ultimate distribution of assets. 18 But the most important fea-
17. Lapse will offer a good example of the significance of time frame 1. At common law a
bequest or devise to a dead person "lapsed" under the principle that one cannot convey or devise
property to a dead person. Marlborough v. Godolphin, 2 Ves. Fr. 61 (1750). Nonetheless, by
statute, selective descendants of the predeceasing legatee who survive the testator are substituted.
But because the common law is reversed by statute-an anti-lapse statute-persons dying before
the creation of the instrument of interest are omitted from the statute's protection. Thus, the
descendants of a legatee or devisee dying during time frame I would lapse and become void. Some
statutes protect interests in time frame I and 2. See, e.g., U.P.C. § 2-605 (1982 & Supp. 1983);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 2313 (1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B: 3-35 (West 1983).
18. Additional references to time frame I will be made when we consider the Rule and the
theoretical possibilities under the Wait and See approach. Also, although not discussed, time
frame I has an effect upon ademption and accumulation. It is a circumstantial period, the best in
which to gather facts.
[Vol. 10:2
ANALYTICAL PRINCIPLE
ture of time frame 1 is its designation as a period preceding an impor-
tant act. Because of this, the circumstances contained there affect in-
tent and distribution.
Time frame 2 is that period between the creation of the instrument
and its effective date. In a testamentary disposition, time frame 2 is
that period between the execution of a will and the death of a testator.
The will speaks as of death, line B, but the words were written at line
A.
Inter vivos dispositions can be more difficult to categorize. With an
inter vivos delivery or creation of a trust, the effective date is the date
of creation, not the death of the settlor. Nonetheless, perhaps in an
effort to spare the harsh consequences of the Rule, some courts treat
line B, the death of the inter vivos settlor, as the creation, effective date
for purposes of the Rule. 19 When this occurs, perhaps only because the
settlor is seen by the court as not really parting with anything until he
or she loses the power to revoke, line B is crucial, for it commences the
period of the Rule.
Time frame 2 is then doubly important. It is the primary ground
of change for persons and property in a testamentary transaction.20 But
even in an inter vivos disposition, time frame 2 is a zone of change and
importance. For instance, time frame 2 shall concern itself with lapse,
19. See, e.g., Cook v. Horn, 214 Ga. 289, 104 S.E.2d 461 (1958). The settlor had created an
inter vivos revocable trust with powers to amend or change the beneficaries. In deciding that the
effective date for purposes of the Rule was the death of the settlor, the Georgia Supreme Court
avoided deciding that the trust violated the Rule because of the mere possibility of after-born issue
to settlor. The Rule is fueled by possibilities and the fact that children could be born to the settlor
after line A, the creation of the inter vivos trust, would normally be a sufficient possibility to
violate the Rule. The Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers) § 1.2 (1983) agrees:
The period of the rule against perpetuities begins to run in a donative transfer with respect
to a non-vested interest in property as of the date when no person, acting alone, has a
power currently exercisable to become the unqualified beneficial owner of all beneficial
rights in the property in which the non-vested interest exists.
Comment (b) goes on to discuss revocable trusts: "The period of the rule against perpetuities with
respect to these non-vested beneficial interests under the trust will not begin to run as long as the
power in the settlor, acting alone, to revoke the trust is in existence."
See also Norton v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust, 253 Ga. 596, 322 S.E.2d 870 (1984). Stat-
utes in New York, Ohio, Virginia, and Washington adopt this approach.
20. Because of previous references to history, an important change in history should be noted
today as it affects the type of property that shall change after delivery or execution of a trust,
inter vivos or testamentary. In an agrarian society land would be the trust res, the future interest
originating as a legal interest in land. Today, the res is more often debt and equity securities:
bonds, stocks, certificates of deposit. Bergin & Haskell, Preface to Estates, supra note 2, at 121.
Also, these equity securities are often international in character. For more information contact the
International Academy of Estate and Trust Law, One Market Plaza, San Francisco, California
94105.
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individual and applications to class gifts. But it also concerns changes
in property, survivorship, and death without issue as it applies to inter
vivos instruments.2' That is, the problems of vesting and intent shall
appear earlier because of the effective date being moved from line B to
line A, the crucial inter vivos line.
Time frame 3 is the most complicated for scriveners drafting testa-
mentary instruments and the attorneys, trust officers, and judges seek-
ing to interpret what was meant. Frame 3 wakes vesting issues. This is
the area between the death of the testator or testamentary settlor and
the condition which we have previously defined as vertical line C. This
is the usual period of estate administration and includes the bulk of
problems pertaining to vesting, implied and express conditions of survi-
vorship, death without issue, the Rule, and post-mortem changes in
property and persons defined as a class. Issues pertaining to this frame
include: early or late vesting, opening and closing of the class and ad-
ministrative convenience, estate property increasing or decreasing, the
perennial problems of powers and how their exercise affects the Rule,
and when and to whom to look when the death of issue occurs.
The fourth time frame is often an extension of the same issues
developed in the third. Time frame 4 is that period after vertical line C,
or that period after the happenings of an event demanded by the inter
vivos trust or the testamentary will. Vesting having occurred in compli-
ance with the Rule, the crucial issue in time frame 4 is payment of
corpus and the attendant problems that follow a condition being met.
Among the circumstances unique to the fourth time frame are the
circumstances surrounding the exercise of a power of appointment by a
donee. The projection by the donee of an inter vivos or testamentary
power of appointment through the imposition of further restraints upon
the fee will extend circumstances past the C line and into the fourth
time frame. 22 This period shall become even more significant as exten-
21. Written documents are treated as sacrosanct because of the Statute of Frauds and the
Statute of Wills. Because the document is in existence in time frame 2, changes in property and
person are not subject to the same freedom of control by the settlor/testator. See U.P.C. §§ 2-507
to -513 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
22. An increasing number of courts and legislatures are choosing to judge remoteness under
the Rule from the time of exercise by the donee rather than from the time of creation of the
power. This is true regardless of the classification of the power. See Sears v. Coolidge, 329 Mass.
340, 108 N.E.2d 563 (1952) (the Second Look doctrine was applied to a special inter vivos
power); Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 110 R.I. 448, 293 A.2d 924 (1972); Industrial Nat'l
Bank v. Barrett, 101 R.I. 89, 220 A.2d 517 (1966). There is increasing support for ameliorating
the harshness of the Rule in spite of the fact that life expectancy is increasing and the length of
private trusts is increasing as well. Indeed, in the case of a general power of appointment, created
[Vol. 10:2
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sions are made regarding the Rule's effect upon powers of appointment.
This is the analytical principle (the Principle). It is a tool for
describing and interpreting the dispositive scheme of an inter vivos set-
tlor or a testamentary testator. It consists of a lineal line representing
time passing from left to right. Intersecting this lineal progression are
three events, representing creation or execution, death, and crucial dis-
position. There are four time periods before and after these three
events and within them take place the changes in persons and prop-
erty.2 3 How these changes in persons and property are understood ac-
cording to the analytical principle shall now be examined according to
four particular areas of trust law: (1) lapse, (2) express and implied
conditions of survivorship, (3) death without issue, and (4) the Rule.
II. LAPSE
Lapse of persons is not a particularly difficult consideration for
scriveners or students, but placed in the context of survivorship, vest-
ing, and the ambulatory nature of testamentary instruments, lapse loses
individuality and becomes obtuse. Confusion is augmented by the fact
that the common law rule24 concerning lapse has been modified by
state statutes in myriad forms, each statute also possessing another
layer of judicial interpretation. Nonetheless, it is possible to separate
lapse into the various time segments of the Principle thereby differenti-
ating it from issues of vesting also found in survivorship. 5 These issues
concern the Rule and the difficult issue of vesting. This is not the arena
when the donor was very young in an inter vivos conveyance, and exercised by an equally young
donee only at death, the time between creation and exercise could be over eighty years by today's
standards. Then, if the period to establish remoteness commences from the date of exercise, an-
other eighty years could elapse before the donor's creation dies: a period of one hundred sixty
years.
23. (1) A (2) B (3) C (4)
1 1 1
24. The common law rule is that a devise or legacy fails or lapses if the devisee or legatee
predeceases the testator. Assuming a valid testamentary instrument that does not contain an alter-
nate gift over to another devisee or legatee, the bequest or devise would lapse into the residuary
estate or pass by intestacy. The rationale was the protection of the testator's intent: if the devisee
or legatee did not survive until when the will speaks, an alternate may not be imposed on the
deceased testator. See, e.g., Simes, Future Interests, supra note 3, at 77.
25. Remember that lapse is a concern over survivorship: a devisee or legatee surviving until
the death of the testator. But this should not be confused with survivorship until the happening of
an event mandated by the deceased testator. See infra part Ill of text. Lapse must be differenti-
ated from the latter. "it should be emphasized that the doctrine of lapse, and the lapse statutes,
apply only to the situation of the legatee or devisee who predeceases the testator." Bergin &
Haskell, Preface to Estates, supra note 2, at 127.
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of lapse; lapse will almost always confine itself to survivorship during
areas 1 and 2 of the Principle.26
Thus, if one were to ask what issues most preoccupy the student or
scrivener in consideration of lapse, a list would come to mind. With
each item, clear and timely legislative pronouncement would clarify
any difficulty, but often there is no determination until after the chal-
lenge and costly suit. Confusion arises when these events occur:
(1) A bequest or devise is made as a class gift in the typical fash-
ion to, for example, children, brothers and sisters, or grandchildren.
(2) The anti-lapse statute applicable in any jurisdiction directs
that representation be made whenever there is a pre-deceasing relative,
but does not define what a relative status includes.
(3) Should the anti-lapse statute be applicable to a relative prede-
ceasing the execution of a testamentary last will and testament, as well
as to the death of a potential legatee/devisee after execution of the
valid will but before the death of the testator?
(4) Should the anti-lapse statute be applicable to inter vivos ar-
rangements in addition to testamentary ones?
(5) Has the testator written alternative language in the will, such
as a gift over in case of death of the legatee or devisee, so as to pre-
clude the operation of the anti-lapse statute? Likewise, has the testator
imposed a condition of express survival, thus wishing to avoid the impo-
sition of the statute?
(6) The effect of the anti-lapse statute upon pretermitted heir stat-
utes, residuary clauses, simultaneous death, and choice of law provi-
sions as in the Uniform Probate Code, also raises issues of substance
for the scrivener or student.
The use of the Principle can assist in clarifying the intent of the
client in each of these cases.
Before the question of the applicability of the anti-lapse statute to
class gifts arises, there must be a determination that the bequest or the
devise was in fact made to a class. What constitutes class language?
Words such as children, grandchildren, or brothers and sisters easily
signal an intent on the part of the scrivener to impart class language,
but there are other cases where the result is not so readily apparent.
26. Only in the rare case when the anti-lapse statute applies to inter vivos transactions will
there be a concern over area 3 of the Principle. Contra Hinds v. McNair, 413 N.E.2d 586 (Ind.
App. 1980) (the court rejected application of the anti-lapse statute to an inter vivos trust). None-
theless, even though the statute does not apply, the interest of the beneficiary will descend to his
or her heirs if vested. Descendability in this manner is broader than the representative named in
the anti-lapse statute. See Richardson v. Chastain, 123 Ind. App. 444, III N.E.2d 831 (1953).
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For instance, a bequest "to my grandchildren, David Dumas and Dar-
rell Dumas, in equal shares, to them, their heirs and assigns forever"2 7
seems to speak more to individuals than it does to a class. Nonetheless,
the court construed the bequest in such a way that it reflected the pre-
dominant intent of the testator to constitute the named legatees a class,
with rights of survivorship. There was no lapse, only survivorship. The
court based its conclusion upon the whole last will and testament, con-
strued in light of competent facts.2 8 Had lapse taken place, the named
statutory representative would have taken a per stirpital share, depriv-
ing surviving members of the class survivorship benefits. This did not
happen in this class gift designation, the bequest passing solely to
James Darrell Dumas.29
In another case, where the court looked to the "whole instru-
ment"30 and the "personal relationship existing between a testator and
potential takers under his will,"31 the pertinent clause was found to be
a class gift designation, rather than an individual bequest subject to the
anti-lapse statute. The clause gave, devised, and bequeathed all of the
estate to: "Bessie Sotman and Mrs. Louise Fournier of Mexico, Maine,
to be equally divided between them, share and share alike."'3 2 When
Bessie predeceased the testator, the heirs claimed that her share had
been to an individual and had lapsed with her death. Thus, the share so
bequeathed would go to the intestate heir, a member of the testator's
family. The court disagreed and, quoting from a prior case, stated:
"We apply the class gift concept to effectuate her real purpose, even
though the language of the residuary clause is not ordinarily calculated
to create a class gift."3 Thus, class construction can arise, even when
the traditional terminology is absent.
While the two preceding cases, In re Estate of Dumas" and
27. In re Estate of Dumas, 117 N.H. 909, 911, 379 A.2d 836, 837 (1977).
28. Id. at 912-14, 379 A.2d at 839. "we may carry out this intent although the general rule
is that a legacy will lapse by the death of a legatee during the lifetime of the testator, where the
bequest is made to several legatees by name, to be equally divided between them." Id.
29. Id.
30. lozapavichus v. Fournier, 308 A.2d 573 (Me. 1973).
31. Id. at 575. In addition to the close family ties, the court also took into consideration a
clause in the will intentionally excluding all of his relatives. The clause would of course exclude
representatives of lapsed legatees.
32. Id. at 574.
33. Id. at 576 (quoting In re Estate of Devin, 108 N.H. 190, 191-92, 230 A.2d 735, 736
(1967)).
34. 117 N.H. 909, 379 A.2d 836 (1977).
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lozapovichus v. Fournier," both present examples of obtuse language
constituting class construction, they portray only the tip of an iceburg
comprised of many more class designation bequests and devises. The
Principle may assist the scrivener or the student in determining intent
and avoiding a misapplication of the anti-lapse statute.
Because the scrivener of the last will and testament is working in
the ambulatory context of a person's life, the Principle assists in posit-
ing intent by first, alerting all involved to the possibility of change from
the present moment when the will is being drafted to the time when the
will speaks, the death of the testator. This is the horizontal line of the
Principle. But of greater import is the designation made along the hori-
zontal line: the execution of the will on line A, and the death of the
testator on line B. Taken by themselves these are not important analyt-
ical points, but seen within a context they provide perspective. The time
frames between each of the lines assists with forming this perspective.
For instance, when the scrivener seeks to benefit a class of persons,
that class is capable of increasing and decreasing from before the time
the will is executed until well past the death of the testator. As we have
seen, no matter how the court arrives at the designation of a class, be it
through explicit language or construction of the will, this fluctuation
will trigger the possibility of the application of the anti-lapse statute.
Should the statute apply to class designations and should that class des-
ignation include those born and dying in area 1, before line A, or
should it only include those born and dying in area 2, between lines A
and B? The Principle provides mental benchmarks to the scrivener and
the student. Finally, it also provides a mental check whereby the scriv-
ener is warned to separate the issue of survivorship"6 from that of vest-
ing, the latter being an issue different from lapse.
As an example, examine the different approaches of class gift ter-
minology applied to lapse in areas 1 and 2. But in so doing, enter the
maze of varying state statutes. In their efforts to preserve the legacy for
a deceased relative's representative, the states have sought to provide
for the predominant intent of the deceased testator, and thus have of-
fered multiple solutions.3 7 A major difference in the statutes is the per-
son benefitted by the statute and who can be a representative of the
35. 308 A.2d 573 (Me. 1973).
36. See infra part III of text (discussion of survivorship).
37. The common law rule was that any bequest or devise to any person who predeceased the
testator lapsed and passed as part of the residuary estate, or intestate should there be no residuary
clause.
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deceased legatee. For example, spouses have been traditionally ex-
cluded from the benefits of the statute,3 8 while a parent may be in-
cluded in the definition of relative.3 9 Other states make distinctions
based upon step-children,40 foster children,41 and adopted children.42
Thus, while the states seek to provide testamentary intent when none
has been given, the statutes prefer blood relatives and constructions
that give preference to those able to bring contest and those most likely
38. In re Estate of Haese, 80 Wis. 2d 285, 259 N.W.2d 54 (1977); In re Estate of Mangel,
51 Wis. 2d 55, 186 N.W.2d 276 (1971); In re Estate of Doge, I Wis. 2d 399, 84 N.W.2d 66
(1957); Cleaver v. Cleaver, 39 Wis. 96 (1875). Wis. Stat. Ann. § 853.27 (West 1971) provides:
Rights of issue of beneficiary dying before testator (lapse)
(I) Unless a contrary intent is indicated by the will, if provision in the will is made for
any relative of the testator and the relative dies before the testator and leaves issue
who survive the testator, then the issue as represent the deceased relative are sub-
stituted for him under the will and take the same interest as he would have taken
had he survived the testator.
(2) For purposes of this section, a provision in the will means:
(a) A gift to an individual whether he is dead at the time of the making of the
will or dies after the making of the will;
(b) A share in a class gift only if a member of the class dies after the making
of the will; or
(c) An appointment by the testator under any power of appointment, unless the
issue who would take under this section could not have been appointed
under the terms of the power.
39. In re Estate of Button, 79 Wash. 2d 849, 490 P.2d 731 (1971). Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
11.12.110 (1967) uses the phrase "other relative," and the court excludes spouse but not parent
from the definition. See In re Estate of Allmond, 10 Wash. App. 869, 520 P.2d 1368 (1974) (anti-
lapse statute reflects legislative determination as a matter of public policy, when testator fails to
provide for possibility that consanguineous beneficiary might predecease him, the lineal descend-
ants of that beneficiary take his share); see also In re Estate of Prather, 527 P.2d 211 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1974) ("other relation" was the term used in the anti-lapse statute and this did not include
spouse of the testator). On the other hand, In re Estate of Thompson, 213 Kan. 704, 518 P.2d 393
(1974), allowed a statute in effect at the date of death of the testator-but not at the time of
execution of the will-to take effect and prevent the lapse of the predeceasing spouse's share.
40. See Tubbs v. Teeple, 388 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (where a stepdaughter
who predeceased her stepmother, the testatrix, was not a "descendant" of the testatrix within the
meaning of the anti-lapse statute).
41. In re Estate of Skinner, 397 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). The foster son of
testator had been devised land by his foster father, but then predeceased the testator; the wife and
children had no interest in the land as foster child was not contemplated by the statute. Note the
difference between anti-lapse and the statutory exclusivity and the issue of vesting under survivor-
ship. See infra part Ill of text (survivorship).
42. Adopted children are generally within the scope of present statutes. This is surely a legis-
lative acknowledgment of family harmony. Hoellinger v. Malzhon, 77 N.D. 108, 41 N.W.2d 217
(1950) (where brother and sister of testator predeceased him, each having an adopted child, the
child takes the share of his parent). See also In re Estate of Blacksill, 124 Ariz. 130, 133, 602
P.2d 511, 513 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (where the testator divided the residuary estate into equal
parts and bequeathed "one of each equal parts to the children of each of my deceased children,"
an adopted child, absent any contrary intent expressed in the will, takes as a representative of the
deceased father).
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to have assisted the testator in accumulating the estates.
The third concern over the use of the anti-lapse statute is the pe-
riod when the statute is to apply. Students and scriveners often confuse
the distinctive time periods when the statute is to apply.43 For instance,
should the anti-lapse statute be applicable to the period of time before
the execution of the last will and testament (period 1, before line A), or
should it confine itself to that period after execution of the will but
before the death of the testator (period 2, between the A and B lines)?
Being able to distinguish between the two time frames is essential to
take advantage of any statute prohibiting lapse. Also, for those scriven-
ers seeking to provide for lapse and "take charge" of the legacy or
devise, the beneficial aspects of providing for lapse will need to be ad-
dressed precisely. The Principle allows for precision, a precision often
absent when the scrivener drafts instruments containing bequests or de-
vises to persons "in residue,""" classes,"5 or the myriad individual be-
quests and devises.
It would seem that the Principle, so dependent as it is upon a tes-
43. Often the statute will not be precise as to when the lapse of the legacy or devise should
be prevented. See, e.g., In re Estate of Mangel, 51 Wis. 2d 55, 186 N.W.2d 276 (1971). There the
anti-lapse statute, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 238.13 (1967), provided:
Rights of issue of deceased legatee.
When a devise or legacy shall be made to any child or other relation of the testator and the
devisee or legatee shall die before the testator, having issue who shall survive the testator,
such issue shall take the estate so given by the will in the same manner as the devisee or
legatee would have done if he had survived the testator unless a different disposition shall
be made or directed by the will.
Cases such as Mangel, and In re Smythe's Will, 64 Misc. 2d 440, 314 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Sur. Ct.
1970) (where there were words stating "during the lifetime of the testator") indicate applicability
of anti-lapse before execution. The Uniform Probate Code follows this pattern. See U.P.C. § 2-
605 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
44. Whether a residuary clause and class gift bequest or devise should be protected by the
anti-lapse statute was the concern of Drafts v. Drafts, 114 So. 2d 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)
(contained the clause, "1 will devise and bequeath all the residue of my property, both real and
personal, to my brothers and sisters, share and share alike"). See also Gianoli v. Gabarcia, 82
Nev. 108, 412 P.2d 439 (1966) (where the residuary clause gave the rest of the estate to "my
nieces and nephews, share and share alike"). The courts arrived at opposite results; the Drafts
court held the statute is inapplicable before execution, and the Gianoli court held the statute
applies to a testamentary beneficiary who shall "die before the testator." There was no specifica-
tion made by the legislature as to how long before the testator's death the beneficiary must die.
See In re Estate of Kalouse, 282 N.W.2d 98, 107 (Iowa 1979) (Harris, J., dissenting) ("For more
than fifty years it has been the policy of this state to prevent lapse where a devisee dies before the
death of the testator, and this has been done by the use of the broadest and most comprehensive
language.") (quoting Dovnins v. Nicholson, 115 Iowa 493, 495-96, 80 N.W. 1064, 1065 (1902)).
45. The most widely cited case on class is Woolley v. Paxson, 46 Ohio St. 307, 24 N.E. 599
(1889), holding that absent language to the contrary by the testator, anti-lapse statutes are appli-
cable to class gifts so as to preserve the share of an heir. The holding in this case did not result in
the protection of a person dead at the execution of the will.
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tamentary scheme, would be deficient with regard to the use of an anti-
lapse provision upon inter vivos trusts. But this is not the case. There
really is a connection with death and inter vivos intent, a connection
that is reflected in the use of the anti-lapse statute with inter vivos
dispositions."' For instance, the death of the settlor of the trust be-
comes the B line in the scheme of the Principle, and in case the settlor
has provided for another life tenant, the C line will have an important
reference. Of course the A line, the usual time the will is executed, will
now be the time that the trust came into effect. If the settlor were to
create a trust for his own benefit, followed by the benefits going to
another and no disposition being made of the remainder, the applicabil-
ity of the anti-lapse statute would arise.' But now, when placed within
the lineal progression of the scheme, we are still faced with the death
of a relative-beneficiary during time frame 2, that is, after the creation
of the trust, but before the death of the life tenant, the settlor in this
case. If there is another life tenant, the lapse could occur during time
frames 2 and 3, and the anti-lapse provisions would apply. Thus, even
though anti-lapse statutes usually do not apply to inter vivos disposi-
tions, there are applications.
This is a rational use of the anti-lapse statute unless there is a
direct prohibition by the legislature. The court in In re Estate of But-
ton reasoned that the only distinction between a testamentary disposi-
tion and an inter vivos one was that the latter disposed of property
without the necessity of complying with the Statutes of Wills.' 8 Be-
cause the anti-lapse statute declared the policy of avoiding the lapsing
46. Perhaps the best case to discuss the applicability of the anti-lapse statute to the interests
of beneficiaries under inter vivos trust is In re Estate of Button, 79 Wash. 2d 849, 490 P.2d 731
(1971), and its treatment in Annotation, Anti-Lapse Statute as Applicable to Interest of Benefi-
ciary Under Inter Vivos Trust Who Predeceases Life-Tenant Settlor, 47 A.L.R.3d 358 (1973).
The trust contained no provision for the trust property should the settlor's mother predecease him.
But it did provide:
Upon the death of the Trustor without having withdrawn the entire fund, the balance of
investments and cash remaining in the trust fund shall be delivered to the Trustor's mother
• . . and her receipt for the residue of said trust fund shall thereupon release the Trustee
from any further responsibility therefor.
Button, 79 Wash. 2d at 850, 490 P.2d at 732. The statute stated that when an estate is devised or
bequeathed to any child, grandchild, or other relative of the testator, and the devisee or legatee
dies before the testator, leaving lineal descendants, such descendants shall take the estate. Id. at
854-55, 490 P.2d at 734. See also Nicosia v. Turzyn, 97 Nev. 93, 624 P.2d 499 (1981) (citing
Button with approval).
47. In the Button case: (1) the Trustor had made no provision for the remainder interest; (2)
the trust secondary beneficiary after himself, his mother, predeceased him; (3) the court inter-
preted the statute to include the mother as a relative; and (4) the benefits were to go to the
relative after the death of the Trustor. 79 Wash. 2d at 849-55, 490 P.2d at 732-35.
48. 79 Wash. 2d at 852. 490 P.2d at 734.
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of gifts to such beneficiaries as relatives, and because the legislature
had not taken a strict position, the statute should apply. With the in-
creasing use of inter vivos arrangements, the applicability of anti-lapse
statutes could be more readily utilized,4 9 but unless the statute ex-
pressly provides for this, the scrivener must be very specific.
A fifth concern of the courts in interpreting anti-lapse statutes
concerns language which may direct an alternate disposition of the be-
quest or devise, thus defeating the imposition of the statute. Quite sim-
ply, the statute should not apply if the instrument, inter vivos or testa-
mentary, makes an alternate gift over upon the death of a legatee. A
minority of courts, for example, have decided that whenever a class gift
designation is made, the testator has already decided that any anti-
lapse statute should not apply, and the surviving members of the class
take as alternative takers for those who predecease the effectiveness of
the instrument.50 Nonetheless, the majority of courts choose to allow
members of a class that predecease the testator, usually after the exe-
cution of the will, to take.5' When all of the persons within the class
predecease the effective date of the instrument, dicta from the courts
indicate that anti-lapse statutes do apply to preserve the gift for de-
49. The same result might have been more easily accomplished without the necessity of ex-
panding the anti-lapse statute to protect inter vivos interests if courts as in Button were to decide:
(I) the beneficiary took a vested remainder, subject to defeasance in the event the settlor
revoked the trust during his life time. This inference could be less onerous than implying
legislative intent.
(2) that such vested remainders descended to the heirs at law of the beneficiary upon his or
her death, subject to the same condition as to defeasance by revocation.
(3) that upon death of the settlor without having revoked the trust, the remainder interest
of the heirs became absolute.
See Randall v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 48 Cal. App. 2d 249, 119 P.2d 754
(1941); Hinds v. McNair, 413 N.E.2d 586 (Ind. App. 1980); Detroit Bank & Trust Co. v. Grout,
95 Mich. App. 253, 289 N.W.2d 898 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Tenny, 165 Ohio St. 513, 138
N.E.2d 15 (1956).
50. This minority position reflects the common law approach that no technical lapse is in-
volved. See In re Estate of Kalouse, 282 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1979) (where testator devised a gift to
a class of first cousins and a named individual, the anti-lapse statute did not apply and only those
alive on the date of the testator's death were entitled to take under such a gift); Davis v. Sanders,
123 Ga. 177, 51 S.E. 298 (1905); Weaver v. McGonigall, 170 Md. 212, 183 A. 544 (1936) (Ma-
ryland statute later amended to specifically apply to class gifts); Trenton Trust & Safe Deposit
Co. v. Sibbits, 62 N.J. Eq. 131, 49 A. 530 (Ch. Ct. 1901); In re Agrella's Will, 175 Misc. 456, 23
N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sur. Ct. 1940).
51. Woolley v. Paxson, 46 Ohio St. 307, 24 N.E. 599 (1889) is cited for the majority posi-
tion. But see Kling v. Goodman, 236 Ala. 297, 181 So. 745 (1938); Tubbs v. Peeple, 388 So. 2d
239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Drafts v. Drafts, 114 So. 2d 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); In re
Estate of Evans, 193 Neb. 437, 227 N.W.2d 603 (1975); Gianoli v. Gambarcia, 82 Nev. 108, 412
P.2d 439 (1966); Cowgill v. Faulconer, 57 Ohio Misc. 6, 8 Ohio Op. 3d 423, 385 N.E.2d 327
(C.P. 1978); Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers) § 1.4 comment K; § 1.5
comments (e) and (g) (1983).
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ceased legatees.52 Avoidance of "laughing heirs" could be a reason for
this.5 3
Lapse in reference to class gift designation is always difficult to
predict because the scrivener never gave any attention to the language
or consequences, thinking that at least one of the class members would
surely survive. Language in a will that affects individual gifts is often
more precise, but often just as confusing. There is no disputing the fact
that a testator can control the application of a lapse statute. The stat-
ute will not be applied where the testator uses specific language that
would clearly demonstrate he or she did not wish to utilize the effect of
the statute. But even in those cases where the statute does not seem
applicable, there have been instances where the courts have applied the
statute because of the language of the testator. For instance, when a
member of a class dies prior to the execution of the testamentary in-
strument, the courts have allowed for the statute to apply to time frame
1 when the will indicates that the predeceasing person was regarded by
the testator as a member of the group.55 Thus, the language used by
the scrivener is of great import; be precise, avoid inadvertent use of the
statute.
Courts prefer to attribute to the testator an intent that the anti-
lapse statutes apply. There seems to be a preference for including as
many people as possible in the disposition of the estate. 6 Also, there is
52. Davis v. Sanders, 123 Ga. 177, 51 S.E. 298 (1905); Trenton Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v.
Sibbits, 62 N.J. Eq. 131, 49 A. 530 (Ch. Ct. 1901). Contra In re Harvey's Estate, I Ch. 567
(Eng. 1893).
53. Laughing heirs are persons not expecting to receive as intestate heirs.
54. Eberts v. Eberts, 42 Mich. 404, 4 N.W. 172 (1880) (the will provided for "surviving
children" and these words were construed to mean only those surviving at testator's death); In re
Estate of Haltforth, 298 Mich. 708, 299 N.W. 776 (1941) (the anti-lapse statute did not apply
when bequest was to children of named person and "the survivor of them"); In re Estate of Evans,
193 Neb. 437, 227 N.W.2d 603 (1975) (statute does not apply when will provides "[slhould any
of my children die before my decease, I hereby give the share of deceased child to the survivor(s)
of said children"); In re Estate of Leuer, 84 Misc. 2d 1087, 378 N.Y.S.2d 612 (Sur. Ct. 1976)
(anti-lapse statute does not apply when residuary bequest is to brothers and sisters "living at the
time of my death"); In re Harris' Will, 138 Misc. 287, 245 N.Y.S. 570 (Sur. Ct. 1930) (anti-lapse
statute does not apply to "children me surviving").
55. In Todd v. Gambrill, 15 Del. Ch. 342, 138 A. 167 (1927), the testator made a specific
gift to the predeceasing person in another portion of the will, thus indicating that the testator
thought the individual was alive at the execution. The court adopted this intent when applying the
anti-lapse statute to a class designation and preserved both bequests for her issue. See also Barn-
hill v. Sharon, 135 Ky. 70, 121 S.W. 983 (1909) (holding that the testator must have intended to
include the descendants of the predeceasing sister under the statute).
56. Sloan v. Thornton, 102 Ky. 443, 43 S.W. 415 (1897), was one of the earlier cases where
the court applied the anti-lapse statute to preserve the bequest for the representatives of the class
who predeceased the testatrix. The testatrix had made a gift to children of an uncle and provided
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a definite preference to include those persons classified as logical ob-
jects of bounty, or family. And this, unlike vesting and questions of
survivorship, is the very group of persons protected by statutes such as
anti-lapse. Two examples of this protective disposition are In re Estate
of Dumas"7 and lozapavichus v. Fournier.5"
Dumas is interesting because the court used a construction that
utilized many of the familiar principles in estate law: implied gifts,59
looking to the entire will, 60 and class gifts. But what the court omitted
was the use of any anti-lapse statute, instead using the language of the
testator to achieve a result that would safeguard the testator's logical
object of bounty. As creativity can be used in interpreting the anti-
lapse statute to protect the object of bounty, so too can the language be
used to do the same without the statute. The bequest in the will was to
"my grandchildren, David Dumas and Darrell Dumas, in equal shares
to them, their heirs, and assigns forever." '61 But also, implicit in the
will, was "one discerning purpose: that the testator's widow was to re-
ceive a life estate in the real estate but nothing greater than the life
estate."62 At the time of death of the testator, both David and Darrell
had predeceased their father, the testator, but David's son James sur-
vived and was alive along with the widow of the testator at the effective
date of the instrument. Was James a class survivor since he was an
heir?
for another disposition if no such children be living at the time of her death. See also Ruff v.
Baumbach, 114 Ky. 336, 70 S.W. 828 (1902). Even though the gift in Ruff was to the testator's
wife during her life, and then to be divided equally among testator's children "then living," the
court decided that the statute provided that grandchildren of the testator (children of a daughter
who predeceased him) were entitled to take as representatives of the mother. Id. at 338, 70 S.W.
at 830. The rationale was that the statute changed the common law construction of the word
"children" to embrace grandchildren unless a different disposition was required by the will. The
testator's use of the phrase "then living" was insufficient to evidence such an intent. Id.
57. 117 N.H. 909, 379 A.2d 830 (1977).
58. 308 A.2d 573 (Me. 1973).
59. One case that addresses the issue of implied gifts to fill gaps is Smith v. Usher, 108 Ga.
231, 33 S.E. 876 (1899). The case refers to American authority declaring that cross remainders
will be implied in a deed as well as in a will. Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Trans-
fers) § 4.2 comment Y (1983). However, cross remainders are not implied if the life tenant(s) or
tenants in tail take as joint tenants or as tenants by the entireties. In such cases the doctrine of
survivorship precludes any gaps in successive enjoyment and there is no need to imply remainders.
See Kemp v. Sutton, 233 Mich. 249, 206 N.W. 366 (1925).
60. The court in Dumas examined the purpose of the entire will, implying what the testator
must have intended. In such a case, "the court is ascertaining not what the testator actually
intended in regard to a particular matter but what he would have intended if he had thought
about the matter." Roberts v. Trustees of Trust Fund, 96 N.H. 223, 73 A.2d 119 (1950).
61. Dumas, 117 N.H. at 911, 379 A.2d at 837.
62. Id. at 912, 379 A.2d at 838.
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The issue confronting the court was whether or not the bequest to
David and Darrell should lapse because each of the sons was individu-
ally named and not alive at the effective date of the will. Thus, their
portions would pass under the residuary clause of the will to the widow.
This did not seem the intent of the testator from the language that he
used. Therefore, the court used his language to avoid lapse. But in so
doing it also allowed for the widow to possess a life estate as directed
by the will. The court employed a class gift6a concept to effectuate its
perception that the testator wanted to protect the logical objects of
bounty.6 By allowing for a class gift construction, the court provided
that a member of the class-James--alive at the effective date of the
instrument, could inherit the property, defeating the lapse that would
result with the death during the lifetime of the testator (time frame 2),
of named individuals David and Darrell. "Where the provisions of the
will indicate a purpose which can be achieved only by construing the
gift as one to a class, the gift will be so construed although the class be
restricted to the beneficiaries that are named."6 5 Thus, whether con-
struing the provisions of an anti-lapse statute or the words of the will as
drafted by the scrivener, the courts will seek to provide for the logical
objects of bounty, changing language as needed.
The second case that demonstrates this practice is lozapavichus v.
Fournier.6 Testator, a Lithuanian immigrant, who made his home with
another Lithuanian family, left his entire estate to a mother and
daughter to be divided equally between them, share and share alike.67
The testator also provided that there would be an absolute exclusion of
all his relatives from the will. 6 Between the time of execution of the
will and the death of the testator, the mother, Bessie Sotman, died.
Since Bessie was not a relative under the definition of any anti-
lapse statute, there was no question of the imposition of the statute. It
was not applicable. But the court did want to provide for persons who
63. Id. at 912, 379 A.2d at 839.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 308 A.2d 573 (Me. 1973). As if to emphasize the courts' willingness to interpret lan-
guage in a will in a manner consistent with public policy, the court stated: "It has long been
recognized ... that precedents are uncertain guides in the interpretation of a will." Id. at 575. In
promoting public policy, "it is appropriate to heed the close family ties and personal relationships
existing between a testator and potential takers under his will. ... Id.
67. The will provided, "to Bessie Sotman and Mrs. Louise Fournier of Mexico, Maine, to be
equally divided between them, share and share alike." Id. at 574.
68. Id. ("I purposely and intentionally omit all my relatives from this my Last Will and
Testament.").
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had certainly become the logical objects of bounty of the testator and
utilized the familiar reference "the intention of the testator at the time
of the execution of the will," and the standard rule: "We look first to
the whole instrument."69
As with the Dumas case, the court in Iozapavichus utilized the
concept of class gifts and thus prevented a lapse of the bequest made to
Bessie which would have forced it into the intestate estate that would
then become the property of the relatives. The relatives were not to
inherit the estate. By providing for a class gift, Mrs. Fournier, by rea-
son of the fact that she survived the testator, took the entire estate as
the sole remaining member of the class.7"
There are other instances of the testator exercising implied control
over the use of the anti-lapse statute. All involve time frames 1, 2, and
3, and can be interpreted as applying to anti-lapse or survivorship, usu-
ally that period between the effective date of the will and the occur-
rence of a condition, like the death of a life tenant. Some survivorship
uses are easy, such as the use of phrases like, "Should any of my said
children die before my decease,"'" allowing for an alternative disposi-
tion because of death of a legatee or devisee. The anti-lapse statute will
not be given effect when the testator creates a condition of survivorship.
While this may result in an intestate distribution, the language of the
testator controls.72 The essential task of the scrivener is to provide as
much certainty as possible in the language of the instrument.
It would appear that in cases like In re Estate of Ulrikson,73 the
testator did not want the anti-lapse statute to apply when he used lan-
guage such as, "and in the event that either one of them predeceases
69. Id.
70. Id. at 576 ("We are satisfied that the provisions of this will, viewed in the light of the
surrounding circumstances, lead to the inescapable conclusion that Joseph Ramon intended a class
gift to Bessie Sotman and Louise Fournier and no one else.").
71. In re Estate of Evans, 193 Neb. 437, 227 N.W.2d 603 (1975). Provision in testatrix's will
stated: "Should any of my said children die before my decease, I hereby give, will, devise and
bequeath the share of said deceased child to the survivor or survivors of my said children, share
and share alike." Id. at 439, 227 N.W.2d at 604. The clause served as an alternative to the
imposition of the anti-lapse statute.
72. In re Estate of Allmond, 10 Wash. App. 869, 520 P.2d 1388 (1974). Testatrix's will
provided for her sister-in-law and her son, share and share alike, "or to the survivor of them if
either of them be deceased." Both predeceased the testatrix and the son's children claimed under
the anti-lapse statute. Even though the court applied the anti-lapse statute, it decided the way it
did because there was "no clearly expressed or implied intent that the anti-lapse statute not ap-
ply." Id. at 872, 520 P.2d at 1391. The testatrix needed a stronger expression of intent than, "if
either of them be deceased." Id.
73. 290 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1980).
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me, then to the other surviving brother or sister."74 But when both
brother and sister predeceased the testator, the court found that the
anti-lapse statute saved the testamentary gift for the brother's issue. 5
Perhaps it was the fact that the bequest was in the form of the residu-
ary clause, or perhaps it was because the court interpreted the state's
anti-lapse statute as requiring an "absolute" condition of survivorship,7 6
but this is one more instance where the scrivener may have thought he
or she had control of the language of the disposition, only to find that
control was not clearly expressed.
Even when the testator has clearly expressed his intent regarding
the use of the anti-lapse statute, there are other statutes that could
affect the disposition of the testator's last will and testament. Similar to
the anti-lapse statute, these statutes presume the intent of the testator
and, again, similarly to the anti-lapse statutes, they provide for the log-
ical objects of the testator's bounty. Two types of statutes are any pro-
vision for pretermitted children77  and any simultaneous death 78
provision.
74. Id. at 759:
SIXTH, All the rest, residue and remainder of my property of whatever kind or character,
I give and bequeath to my brother, MELVIN HOVLAND, and my sister, RODINE
HELGER, share and share alike, and in the event that either of them shall predecease me,
then to the other surviving brother or sister.
75. Id. The court stated its reason for applying the anti-lapse statute: "It is apparent that
the law prefers testacy over intestacy and that the anti-lapse statute applies unless a contrary
intention is indicated by the will." The presence of the anti-lapse statute was sufficient to raise the
standard for the language necessary to evidence testator's intent.
76. Id.
77. The Uniform Probate Code provides for pretermitted children in the following fashion:
Pretermitted Children:
(a) If a testator fails to provide in his will for any of his children born or adopted after
the execution of his will, the omitted child receives a share in the estate equal in
value to that which he would have received if the testator had died intestate unless:
(1) it appears from the will that the omission was intentional;
(2) when the will was executed the testator had one or more children and de-
vised substantially all his estate to the other parent of the omitted child; or
(3) the testator provided for the child by transfer outside the will and the intent
that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by state-
ments of the testator or from the amount of the transfer or other evidence.
(b) If at the time of execution of the will the testator fails to provide in his will for a
living child solely because he believes the child to be dead, the child receives a
share in the estate equal in value to that which he would have received if the
testator had died intestate.
(c) In satisfying a share provided by this section, the devises made by the will abate as
provided in Section 3-902.
U.P.C. § 2-302 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
78. Brundige v. Alexander, 547 S.W.2d 232, 233 (Tenn. 1976), highlights a simultaneous
death statute from Tennessee: "Where the title to property or the devolution thereof depends
upon priority of death and there is no sufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise than
simultaneously, the property of each person shall be disposed of as if he had survived, except as
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Pretermitted heir and anti-lapse statutes are similar in a number
of ways. In addition to the preference they give to logical objects of
bounty, they also are contingent upon the expressed intent of the scriv-
ener, and finally, they vary from state to state. For instance, the Mis-
souri79 type of pretermitted heir statute provides that if a person dies
leaving a child or grandchild not named or provided for in the last will
and testament, the testator shall be deemed to have died intestate as to
them. The Massachusetts"0 type of statute is somewhat similar: If a
testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, or for the
issue of a deceased child, that child or the children shall take the same
share of his estate as in the case of intestacy unless it appears that such
omission was intentional.
Intent is important. This can be seen from the case of In re Estate
of Fells.8' Testator, at the time of the execution of the will and at his
date of death, had eight living sons, one predeceased son, two prede-
ceased daughters, and assorted grandchildren who were the issue of the
deceased sons and daughters. The will had given the residue of the es-
tate to his "present living sons."82 He named the sons and provided an
alternative gift if one should die before him. It was the grandchild of a
predeceasing child that sought to change this scheme and share in the
estate of his parent. Remembering that anti-lapse should not apply be-
cause of the intent of the testator to provide for an alternative gift, the
court could apply the pretermitted heir statute if the issue of any de-
ceased child was unintentionally omitted. As the testator had not re-
ferred to any grandchildren in drafting the will, the court concluded
that he did not intentionally omit them and they were allowed to take
under the pretermitted heir statute.83
Also, in a case where both the anti-lapse statute and the pretermit-
provided otherwise in this chapter." Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-3-102 (1984).
79. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 474.240 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
80. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 191, § 25 (West 1958).
81. 70 Idaho 399, 219 P.2d 941 (1950). The statute read:
When any testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, or for the issue of his
deceased child, unless it appears that such omission was intentional, such child, or the issue
of such child, must have the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had died
intestate, and succeeds thereto as provided in the preceding section.
Idaho Code § 14-320 (1950).
82. 70 Idaho at 403, 219 P.2d at 942. The will also provided: "If one of the above named
devisees die [sic], then his share shall do (sic] in equal shares to his surviving brothers." Id.
83. "It does not clearly and fairly appear from the words of such will that the testator had in
mind his pretermitted grandchildren and intentionally and deliberately omitted to provide for
them in his will." Id. at 407, 219 P.2d at 945.
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ted heir statute are part of the court's opinion, the court in In re Estate
of Todd " reviewed a bequest in a last will and testament to the testa-
tor's wife and son, or to the survivor of them. When the son prede-
ceased the wife leaving issue, the court, upon the death of the testator,
decided that the anti-lapse statute precluded the issue from taking.
Nonetheless, the issue of the predeceasing son were entitled to a share
of the estate by intestacy in accordance with the pretermitted heir stat-
ute since the testator's survivorship provision had caused the grandchil-
dren to be omitted from the will without announced intent. If the will
had disclosed an intentional omission, the result would have been
different.85
Finally, the anti-lapse statute can apply directly to simultaneous
death statutes in situations as presented by Brundidge v. Alexander.8"
The court found that when the testatrix and the husband beneficiary
were killed in an automobile accident simultaneously, the Uniform Si-
multaneous Death Act as enacted in Tennessee87 mandated that the
will be construed as if the husband had predeceased her. When the
anti-lapse statute was then applied, the residuary legacies under the
testatrix's will passed to the surviving issue of her husband-four chil-
dren from a prior marriage-persons able to take under the anti-lapse
statute because the anti-lapse statute applied to spouses who prede-
cease. Due to the operations of the simultaneous death statute the hus-
band predeceased his wife and therefore four strangers inherited her
estate.88
Whenever the legislature attempts to provide for the absent intent
84. 17 Cal. 2d 270, 109 P.2d 913 (1941).
85. The late Justice Traynor of the Supreme Court of California wrote a concurring opinion
in which he specifically compared the state's anti-lapse and pretermitted heir statutes. His concur-
ring opinion describes how the majority's utilization of the pretermitted heir statute and its intes-
tate portion could provide a greater inheritance than any anti-lapse protection of a particular
bequest or devise. Id. at 276, 109 P.2d at 916 (Traynor, J., concurring).
86. 547 S.W.2d 232 (Tenn. 1976). The anti-lapse statute provided:
Whenever the devisee or legatee to whom .... an immediate devise or bequest is made, dies
before the testator, or is dead at the making of the will, leaving issue which survives the
testator, said issue shall take the estate or interest devised or bequeathed which the devisee
or legatee .... as the case may be, would have taken, had he survived the testator, unless a
different disposition thereof is made or required by the will.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-3-105 (1984).
87. Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-3-102 (1984).
88. The court sensed the injustice of the result but felt constrained by legislative intent:
Whether or not these two statutes should be construed in the manner and with the result
urged by the plaintiffs depends upon the legislative intent embodied in each of them. Since
both statutes deal with the devolution of property of decedents, we deem them to be 'in
pari materia' and will construe them accordingly.
Brundige, 547 S.W.2d at 233.
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of the testator or the inter vivos settlor, the result is often far from
what the decedent would have intended. A glance at public opinion
polls regarding intestacy statutes would confirm this. Furthermore,
when scriveners make broad attempts to control inadvertent mistakes
through residuary clauses or choice of law statutes, 89 the remedy is
often no panacea.
Only through the use of more precise language can the intent of
the testator be given proper inter vivos or testamentary effect. Through
the use of the Principle, the scrivener can place the intent of the testa-
tor in a context that will enjoy more certainty. For instance, by ex-
plaining to the testator, or the settlor, options and possibilities available
in each of four time frames, plus specific events that invite conse-
quences, the testator can be more specific concerning goals. Further-
more, because statutes such as anti-lapse, pretermitted heir, and simul-
taneous death can be used to thwart intent, the necesssity of strict
control is both demanded and in the best interest of professional re-
sponsibility. Using the Principle as a tool for client preparation and
discovery of precise intent is the purpose and design of the professional
scrivener.
III. SURVIVORSHIP
The most important distinction to be made between anti-lapse and
survivorship is the fact that the former is controlled by statute, while
the latter is more exclusively the domain of the court. True, as has
been seen, the courts can construe the anti-lapse statute, often to reach
a result not contemplated by the legislature. But as a rule, the statute
in anti-lapse jurisdictions controls who can benefit from the statute,
when the period of anti-lapse is to commence, and to whom the bequest
or devise goes when a beneficiary has predeceased the testator or, in
rare instances, the inter vivos settlor.
In those jurisdictions where there is no anti-lapse statute and the
bequest or devise must fall victim to the common law rule, the only
way by which lapse may be prevented is through construction of lan-
guage that seems to evidence the scrivener's intent to provide other-
wise. When we enter the mysterious world of testator's intent and the
language that evidences it, we are in the realm of survivorship and the
concomitant issues of vesting, rules of administrative convenience in
89. See U.P.C. § 2-602 (1982 & Supp. 1983) ("The meaning and legal effect of a disposition
in a will shall be determined by the local law of a particular state selected by the testator in his
instrument .... ").
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class gifts, and an absence of those logical objects of bounty that were
so protected in the lapse statutes.
Survivorship, quite simply, challenges the interpreters of the will
to ask who is to receive the bequest or the devise when either a member
of a class or an individual predeceases the testator. This is the same
issue that presented itself with lapse, but the absence of a statute
makes the outcome less certain. And even if there is a statute, does it
apply to class gifts, to the affected class of persons, to the time frame in
which the death has occurred? Again, if there is no statute, the courts
are left with the vague rules of construction that allow some prediction,
and prediction is very difficult to analyze.9" Courts can take various
expressions of the testator and arrive at conclusions that are often
contradictory.
For instance, in In re Estate of Miner,9' all the residuary legatees
but one sister and brother predeceased the testator and one brother
who predeceased left children who claimed a share of the estate. The
court would not allow the issue of the predeceasing brothers and sisters
to share in the estate, saying that the will had been drafted by an attor-
ney and the phrase "shares shall be divided equally among the survi-
vors thereof" should be seen as a legal intent to exclude the issue. The
use of the word survivors was crucial in the case.9 A significant num-
ber of courts hold that unless there is something in the context of the
instrument or the surrounding circumstances to indicate differently, the
word "survivor" should be given its literal interpretation as one who
outlives another, or one of two or more persons who lives after another
or others have died.9" The courts mention that they are willing to enter-
90. See Annotation, Wills: Gift Over to "Survivors" of Class or Group of Designated Benefi-
ciaries as Restricted to Surviving Members of Class or Group, or as Passing to Heirs or Repre-
sentatives of Deceased Beneficiary, 54 A.L.R.3d 280 (1974). Since the principal factor in deter-
mining whether a gift over to "survivors" of a group or class of designated beneficiaries is
restricted to surviving members of a group or class, or whether it passes instead to the heirs or
legal representatives of a predeceasing beneficiary is clearly that of the testator's intent. It is
difficult to formulate any generalizations from the cases other than to note references by the court
to general canons of construction: testator's intent controls, effect is to be given to all words and
terms, or words of a technical meaning are presumed to be used in their technical sense.
91. 129 Vt. 484, 282 A.2d 827 (1971). The residuary estate was bequeathed to three sisters
and four brothers of the testator with the qualification that if "any of the brothers and sisters so
named shall predecease me, then I direct that her or his share shall be divided equally among the
survivors." Id. at 486, 282 A.2d at 828.
92. See Carlson v. Carlson, 39 II1. App. 3d 281, 350 N.E.2d 306 (1976). When the phrase
was "or their survivor or survivors, share and share alike," the court also precluded inheritance by
issue.
93. Testatrix bequeathed the residue of her estate to her two cousins and a half-sister in
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tain different interpretations, such as when there are no survivors or
conditions that decry the literal meaning of survivor, but otherwise the
meaning should be taken literally.9
There are some cases that allow for the heirs, spouses or legal rep-
resentatives of any predeceasing beneficiary to take along with survi-
vors. Again, it is essential to note that these persons so taking often
would not be allowed to take under any applicable anti-lapse statute;
the statute would designate who could "represent" the deceased. But
not so with issues of survivorship or vesting consideration. For instance,
in In re Estate of Mohr,95 the court held that the testatrix's use of the
words "survivor and or survivors of them," included the spouses of the
beneficiaries who predeceased the testatrix. To allow the spouses to
take even though there were existing survivors, the court considered a
letter to a sister-in-law from the testatrix where she said she intended
to include spouses. Also, there were oral assurances and, after the
death of the sister, the testatrix wrote to the plaintiff telling him she
would have to change her will because if her brother's wife should
"outlive all of us, I don't want all of my money going to the family."9
Thus, the courts prefer to restrict the bequest or devise to the survivors,
but when the language of the scrivener permits interpretation,97 the
courts will allow for the heirs, spouses or legal representatives to take.98
equal shares and "in the event that my said cousins or half sisters should predecease me, then and
in that event I give, devise, and bequeath the share of such deceased to the survivors of my cousins
and half sister." In re Estate of Gallop, 248 So. 2d 686, 687 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), cert.
dismissed sub nom. Lee v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 257 So. 2d 259 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1972). One cousin
predeceased the testatrix leaving a daughter who claimed one third of the residuary estate. Id.
94. See Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Thrall, 184 Conn. 497, 440 A.2d 200 (1981);
Swole v. Burnham, 111 Conn. 120, 149 A. 229 (1930); Hartwick v. Heberling, 364 III. 523, 4
N.E.2d 965 (1936); Duering v. Brill, 127 Md. 104, 96 A. 269 (1915); Galloupe v. Blake, 248
Mass. 196, 142 N.E. 818 (1924); Converse v. Byars, 112 Mont. 372, 118 P.2d 144 (1941); Baily's
Estate, 52 Pa. D. & C. 297 (1945).
95. 7 Cal. App. 3d 641, 86 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1970).
96. Id. at 645, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
97. In one case, the language used was direct in bequeathing to a number of named benefi-
ciaries a legacy, providing that the shares of any such nieces or nephews who predecease should be
divided among those who survive. This would seem to exclude the issue of those predeceasing.
Nonetheless, the will continued that in the event that "any of the above named nieces shall prede-
cease me leaving issue, then I direct that the entire share or shares of said deceased niece or nieces
shall go to the issue of such deceased niece or nieces." The court held that the second provision
modified the absolute gift made and allowed the issue of the predeceasing nieces to take. In re
Heuss' Estate, 14 Misc. 2d 408, 411-12, 179 N.Y.S.2d 767, 770-71 (Sur. Ct. 1958).
98. See also Smith v. Paterson (In re Estate of Smith), 107 III. App. 3d 1038, 63 II1. Dec.
622, 438 N.E.2d 553 (1982); In re Will of Le Roy, 54 Misc. 2d 33, 281 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Sur. Ct.
1967); In re Will of Goodliffe, 18 Misc. 2d 412, 185 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sur. Ct. 1959); In re Barr's
Estate, 2 Pa. 428 (1846).
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Until now, survivorship has been compared with lapse. That is, to
the period of time most associated with prior to the execution of a last
will and testament, or prior to the death of the testator (time frames 1
and 2). Nonetheless, survivorship can relate to a third time frame, that
between the death of the testator and the death of a life tenant. It
could also refer to an inter vivos situation where we are concerned with
that period of time between the effectiveness of the trust and the death
of a life tenant. These are situations that are usually the province of
vesting and the concomitant rule that allows for rights in heirs rather
than the narrow class of beneficiaries listed in anti-lapse statutes. The
issue faced is the point of survivorship: must the beneficiary survive the
testator or the life tenant in order to achieve a vested interest?
The preferred construction is to require the "survivors" to survive
the life tenant,99 but in an age that seeks to provide for early vesting,
there is a definite trend toward surviving only to the earlier date, the
death of the testator. 1°0 Again, the language of the instrument controls:
"[T]he presumption is that the words requiring survivorship refer not
to the testator's death but to the termination of the preceeding life es-
tate;"10 1 "[a]bsent language pointing a contrary intention, words of
survivorship refer to the time of the testator's death 'only in the case of
an absolute devise or bequest to one and in case of his death to an-
other'; "102 or, "when the testator used the words 'my surviving heirs'
he was speaking of persons who would be living or surviving at the
death of [the son]."1°3 The conclusion is to look to the language of the
instrument for at least some evidence of intent.
Finally, it should be mentioned that there will be those cases
where there are no survivors. That is, there is no conflict between one
or more survivors and another class of persons identified as heirs,
spouses, or legal representatives. Instead, there is a dispute among the
intestate heirs, the residuary legatees, and the representatives of those
who should have been survivors. The courts are more willing to provide
99. In re Gautier's Will, 3 N.Y.2d 502, 169 N.Y.S.2d 4, 146 N.E.2d 771 (1957).
100. Moorman v. Moorman, 156 Ind. App. 606, 297 N.E.2d 836 (1973); Porter v. Porter, 50
Mich. 456, 15 N.W. 550 (1883); In re Nass's Estate, 320 Pa. 380, 182 A. 401 (1936). As some
authors have noted, the entire problem could be resolved without litigation if the scrivener were
more diligent: "The instrument should be crystal clear as to the requirements of survivorship or
the absence of any such requirement." Bergin & Haskell, Preface to Estates, supra note 2, at 132.
101. In re Will of Hewlett, 77 Misc. 2d 38, -' 352 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408 (Sur. Ct. 1974).
102. In re Nicholas' Will, 50 Misc. 2d 76, __, 269 N.Y.S.2d 623, 627 (Sur. Ct. 1969)
(quoting In re Gautier's Will, 3 N.Y.2d 502, 508, 169 N.Y.S.2d 4, 7, 146 N.E.2d 771, 773
(1957)).
103. Kale v. Forrest, 278 N.C. 1, 16-17, 178 S.E.2d 622, 632 (1971).
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for the representatives, rather than the intestate heirs of the testator. In
In re Kuflik's Will,10 4 the testator gave all of the residue of his estate
to his father, two sisters, and a brother, providing that in the event the
father, brother, or sisters should predecease him, the share of such ben-
eficiary should pass to his or her issue and if no such issue, then to the
survivor or survivors of such legatees. The preceding has shown such
clauses to be quite common. Nonetheless, in this instance, all four of
the survivors died before the testator during the Nazi occupation of
Poland, and only one child of a sister survived. The court channeled all
of the estate to this one child by finding that as an issue of the benefi-
ciary he was entitled to his mother's share. Further, the shares of the
deceased brother and sister passed to him by intestacy. 0 5 The court
again turns to the primary intent of the testator and is unwilling to
provide for any substitution when that intent can be effectuated, even
though not perfectly.
When the Principle enters the realm of survivorship it does so in
an effort to differentiate survivorship from lapse, identify heirs as dis-
tinct from issue, and define vesting rather than statutory preference. In
the most common event of a testamentary trust ending at the death of
a life tenant, the principle graphically illustrates the events as happen-
ing in time frame 3 and thus the issue is vesting. When survivorship is
mentioned in a will and the legatee does not survive until the death of
the testator, the possibility of lapse arises because of presence in time
frame 2. Nonetheless, applicability of the anti-lapse statute is not guar-
anteed because of the condition of survivorship.
Intent of the settlor is still the major issue. The courts are willing
to imply this intent in issues of survivorship and vesting, just as they
were when lapse was discussed. How the scrivener drafts this intent
must depend upon the information received from the client. The Princi-
ple is a context for explaining the options and the consequences.
IV. DEATH WITHOUT ISSUE
One of the most difficult areas of the law for students and scriven-
ers is the area of death without issue. Indeed, "there has been consider-
able litigation during the past several centuries over the meaning of a
104. 23 Misc. 2d 56, 199 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sur. Ct. 1960).
105. Id. at 58, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 894. There was a clause that provided an alternate disposi-
tion if any of the primary beneficiaries could not be located within five years. But the court did
not find this detracted from the intent of the testator and gave the estate to the "primary" benefi-
ciaries named in the will
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gift to 'A and his heirs, but if A shall die without issue, to B and his
heirs.' "'I' The difficulty really evolves around rules of construction
that flow from the English view of indefinite failure of construction,0 7
to a more American need for definition, 108 and then back again to a
substituted or successive type of construction." 9 Since the debate
among the different constructions has evolved over centuries, there is
no reason to think that it shall abate in the near future. Nonetheless,
there must be a means by which the scrivener and the student may
better appreciate and generate the intent of the decedent or settlor.
The confusion resulting from the clauses drafted to contain refer-
ences to death without issue results from confusion when the named
taker or the issue must survive. It is a confusion over the finish line, not
the doctrine itself. Indeed, as Professor Lewis Simes states: "To the
layman nothing could be freer from ambiguity than the limitation 'to
A, and if he dies without issue, to B.' "110 Since most American juris-
dictions are not concerned with indefinite failure of issue-failure of
issue whenever that may occur-but rather with definite failure, the
question of when is not as important. What is important is the finish
line: "before which failure of issue must occur.""' There must be a
point in time after which the testator is willing to relinquish control
over ultimate disposition of the property." 2 Perhaps it was the English
court's interpretation of indefinite failure of issue that created the con-
106. Bergin & Haskell, Preface to Estates, supra note 2, at 236. Other authors admit the
confusion as well. "[Wihen these words (die without issue] are put together . . . at least five
constructions have received some recognition by courts at one time or another." Simes, Future
Interests, supra note 3, at 196.
107. By "indefinite failure of issue" is meant the failure of issue of a person whenever that
may occur, whether by the person's own death without any surviving issue, or by the subsequent
death of the last of the person's issue. Bergin & Haskell, Preface to Estates, supra note 2, at 236.
108. By definite failure of issue is meant the failure of issue of a person at a definite time; the
definite time indicated in the cases is the death of the named person. Id.
109. Substitutional language implies that when the testator limits a bequest or devise "to A,
and if he die without issue, to B," the testator means that if A dies without issue then B receives
the bequest or device. If A or his issue survives the testator, B is excluded. This view is criticized
by Simes. See Simes, Future Interests, supra note 3, at 196-203. Successive language demands
that the issue of A survive him, A, or B receives the bequest or device. Note that there are two
finish lines: the testator's death for substitutive language, and the death of A for successive lan-
guage. See Warren, Gifts Over on Death Without Issue, 39 Yale L.J. 332 (1930); Bergin &
Haskell, Preface to Estates, supra note 2, at 236-38.
110. Simes, Future Interests, supra note 3, at 196.
Ill. Id.
112. See Annotation, Remainderman-Death Without Issue, 26 A.L.R.3d 407 (1983). The
point of time chosen by the creator of the trust or designated in the last will and testament could
be a time for distribution of the estate (i.e., age of 30) or the period of postponement of enjoyment
(i.e., when married), or until the exhaustion of a prior estate.
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fusion, " 8 or perhaps it was the predominance of real property in the
system and the familiar usage of indefinite construction."" It is not
surprising that whenever there was insufficient intent demonstrated by
the scrivener, the English courts adopted the definite construction as a
remedy " and eventually accepted a statutory preference for definite
construction. " 6 Today, the American preference for definite failure of
issue construction certainly follows the lessons learned from the English
courts.
The past confusion has been lessened by the adoption of definite
construction by statute or common law. Thus, there must be a definite
preference for A either having issue or not having issue at some point
in time. This said, what is the point in time? " 7 Only two points are
important to use in construing the intent of the creator: the death of
the creator-which would be the B line-or the death of the life ten-
ant, usually the person expected to have issue. This would be the C
line. Using our example again, this would have the effect of saying: To
A, and if A dies before the creator without leaving issue surviving the
creator, then to B. Once A or any issue survives the creator, a fee sim-
ple results and B is excluded. 1 8 This is a substitutional type of con-
struction and seems to have the effect of saying: "The gift to B is sub-
stitutional if A or his issue are not available to take it at my death." It
creates immediate ownership at the death of the creator and thus
would seem to fulfill the desires of those jurisdictions preferring aliena-
bility above all else. Such jurisdictions would have to rely upon precise
construction provided by scriveners in various cases. It would also de-
mand awareness of events in both time frames 2 and eventually 3.
In one case, the testator's will provided, after giving a life estate to
his wife, that "upon the death of my said wife ...his estate to his
113. The English courts decided that "die without issue" meant the indefinite construction,
implying failure at any time. This created a fee tail and may have reflected the intent of the
English landowner. 4 Kent; Commentaries on American Law 274 (12th ed. 1873).
114. The English courts applied the indefinite failure of issue construction to personal prop-
erty as well, creating additional problems since there was no fee tail construction for personalty
and any executory interest was void under the rule against perpetuities. Simes, Future Interests,
supra note 3, at 198.
115. Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590 (1620).
116. 7 Will. IV & I Vict., ch. 26, § 29 (1837).
117. When using the analytical principle the points in time will be the same for inter vivos
instruments as well as testamentary ones: the A line is of course the point of creation, and the B
line as the death of the creator (testator), with the C line the occurence of an event such as the
death of a life tenant.
118. Simultaneous death statutes and provisions within the creating instruments will always
affect the word "surviving." Scriveners and planners should be cautious.
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three children" and providing further that the share of such child as
may be deceased be divided equally among his heirs, but "in case there
be no such heirs ... the share ... shall be equally divided among [the
testator's] surviving children."'1 9 Upon the death of the testator one
son was alive but predeceased the mother's life estate. The court de-
cided that the language of the will called for a substitutional construc-
tion and thus the interest of the son became vested at the death of the
father, the testator, and passed to the son's widow. 120 Many of the
older cases refer to this substitutional type of construction,12 ' and some
of the newer ones as well. In one, testator gave a life estate to his wife
and upon her death to be divided among his four children. The ho-
lographic will provided that, "should either of them die without a child,
their estate to be equally divided between the survivors."' 22 A codicil
was written nine years later stressing that the children should divide
the estate among themselves. At the death of the testator there were
four children surviving and they continued to survive the wife, the life
tenant. Eventually, two of the children died childless and one of their
nieces claimed that the two dying without issue took a conditioned fee
subject to defeat upon their eventual death without issue. The court
rejected this construction, deciding that the children took, upon the
death of the testator, an unconditional fee simple absolute interest.
This was demanded because of the construction of the last will and
testament.'23 Because the testator had directed the children to divide
up and settle the estate among themselves, the court assumed a substi-
tutional construction.
The substitutional construction can be used with inter vivos dispo-
sitions as well. When parents executed a deed to their daughter in
1905, the deed provided for a reversion of the property to the grantors
or their estate if the daughter should die without issue. The daughter
did in fact die without issue, devising the estate to others, but this was
after the death of the grantors. Her brother challenged her devise
claiming that his sister only had a defeasible fee and when she died
119. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 63 A.D. 370, 371, 71 N.Y.S. 780, 781 (1901).
120. Id. at 372-73, 71 N.Y.S. at 782.
121. For cases supporting the construction that "death without issue" refers to death during
the testator's lifetime or substitutional construction, see Borgner v. Brown, 133 Ind. 391, 33 N.E.
92 (1893); Tarbell v. Smith, 125 Iowa 388, 292 N.W. 118 (1904); Ballance v. Garner, 161 Kan.
371, 168 P.2d 533 (1946); Lawrence v. Calam, 236 N.Y. 168, 140 N.E. 232 (1923); Korn v. Friz,
128 Wis. 428, 107 N.W. 659 (1906) (recognizing the rule).
122. Martin v. Taylor, 521 S.W.2d 581, 582 (Tenn. 1975).
123. Id. at 585.
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without issue, the land reverted to the estate of his parents, and thus
himself as heir. 124 The court likened the deed to an inheritance, partic-
ularly because the evidence supported the fact that the deed was in-
tended as an advance to the daughter against her future inheritance.
Therefore, the court said, where there has been a devise or gift of prop-
erty to take effect immediately with a gift over on the contingency of
the first taker's death without issue, the reference is to death during the
lifetime of the testator or grantor unless a contrary intent is found in
the language of the instrument or the circumstances surrounding the
execution. 2 ' The devise by the daughter was effective. As has often
been said, the language used by the testator or the creator is the most
important factor. 26
Substitutional construction may well be the logical answer to the
problems inherent in the indefinite fee tail preference of the early En-
glish courts. The fee simple determination of a substitutional interpre-
tation would be just the opposite of what was then considered preferen-
tial. Nonetheless, the point was even then to do the will of the testator,
and there is significant authority that his will might sometimes be done
124. Collins v. Smithson, 585 S.W.2d 598 (Tenn. 1979). The court quotes with approval
Martin v. Taylor, 521 S.W.2d 581 (Tenn. 1975).
125. Collins, 585 S.W.2d at 605. In Bloodsworth v. Bloodsworth, 467 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1971), the court discussed the imposition of a 20 year testamentary trust. This was a middle
point between the death of the creator and the death of A, the person's issue in whom we are
interested. When a son died childless but after the 20 years had elapsed, the interest created by
the testator became a fee simple absolute as the termination of the trust. It is notable that this is
after the death of the testator, but not to the point of the death of the named taker. See also
Stanley v. Brietz, 612 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981). A few jurisdictions have adopted the
construction that where the instrument creating such a remainder interest mentions or indicates
any point of time, between the donor's death and that of the primary remainderman, the contin-
gency will be limited to the interval preceding such time absent any intent to the contrary. Des-
kins v. Williamson, 106 S.W. 258 (Ky. 1907); St. John's Church v. Eyre, 85 N.J. Super. 422, 204
A.2d 905 (1964); Davis v. Scharf, 99 N.J. Eq. 88, 133 A. 197 (Ch. Ct. 1926); see generally
Hughuley v. Burney, 211 Ala. 397, 100 So. 817 (1924); Sterling v. Huntley, 139 Ga. 21, 76 S.E.
375 (1912); Linton v. Hail, 201 Ky. 698, 258 S.W. III (1924); Teasdale v. Harrison, 16 N.J.
Super. 335, 84 A.2d 563 (1951).
126. In Hart v. Rogers, 527 S.W.2d 230, 231-32 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975), the testatrix gave
her grandson an absolute gift of property and provided that if he "should precede me in death or
if he should die without issue ... then property under this will shall descend ... to the children of
my granddaughter ... in fee simple." The court decided that the gift over, unless controlled by
other provisions of the will, takes effect upon the first taker's death at any time, whether before or
after the testator. Thus, absent problems with the rule against perpetuities, the intention of the
scrivener controls. See also Reid v. Armistead, 228 Ala. 75, 151 So. 874 (1933); Hughuley v.
Burney, 211 Ala. 397, 100 So. 817 (1924); Dutton v. Hughes, 219 Ga. 645, 135 S.E.2d 407
(1964); Sterling v. Huntley, 139 Ga. 21, 76 S.E. 375 (1912); Dean v. Town of Nutley, 70 N.J.L.
217, 57 A. 1089 (Ct. Err. & App. 1904).
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with a successive construction.127 Indeed, Professor Simes argues that
anytime a scrivener uses the contingency "if A die without issue," a
substitutional construction should not be used.1"8 Rather, the scrivener,
at the testator's request, could be seeking to keep the property within
the blood line for as long as possible, or at least until the death of A,
not the date of death of the testator or any additional life tenant."2 9 If
successive construction is to be utilized by the court in distribution, it
will usually be because the scrivener explicitly requested it, the nature
of the property in question, 30 or the presence of a statute demanding a
preference for successive construction.
Some statutes may only abolish the common law rule that death
without issue means an indefinite failure of issue:' 3' if at any time in
the future A's line of descent should come to an end (hence the contin-
gency of without issue), then there was a gift over to the contingent
remainderman.3 2 But most statutes go beyond simply abolishing the
127. See Simes, Future Interests, supra note 3, at 199. "However, the better view is that the
phrase 'if he die without issue' refers to the failure of issue of A at the time of his death, whenever
that may occur." Id. This is successive construction and is probably more likely to preserve the
true intent of the testator.
128. Substitutional construction should be used for a contingency such as "if he die," since
we know that A will die sometime and the word "if" is uncertain. Id. at 200.
129. Courts, relying on the donor's intent as disclosed by the instrument, have sometimes
decided that the limitation of death without issue refers to without issue at any time. See Daniel v.
Daniel, 102 Ga. 181, 28 S.E. 167 (1897); Abrahams v. Sanders, 274 II1. 452, 113 N.E. 737
(1916); Dunn v. Dunn, 191 Ky. 817, 232 S.W. 40 (1921); Vickers v. Vickers, 205 Tenn. 86, 325
S.W.2d 544 (1959). In this construction the remainderman receives a determinable fee subject to
defeasance upon the happening of the designated contingency. For instance, testator's will gave his
wife a life estate and upon her death a specified sum was to be given to named children and the
residue divided among seven named children and "heirs of their body." Furthermore, "should any
of the above named children die without issue . . . I desire the remaining property should be
divided among the remaining children." The court decided that the contingency the testator in-
tended as the finish line was the death of a child without issue, not testator's death (the B line), or
the death of the life tenant-wife (the C line). Each child took a contingent remainder in the shares
of the six other children. See Krieger v. Stauffer, 34 Ohio 364, 67 N.E.2d 449 (1946); Pinkston v.
Pinkston, 254 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); see also In re Carother's Estate, 161 Cal. 588,
119 P. 926 (1911); Lyons v. Catharin, 205 Mich. 476, 171 N.W. 406 (1919).
130. "if the future interest situation arises under a trust of personal property, then certainly
the construction which gives A an absolute interest if he survives X makes good sense." An execu-
tory interest over personal property is awkward. Bergin & Haskell, Preface to Estates, supra note
2, at 238.
131. Some statutes may abolish the common law rule and nothing more, offering no prefer-
ence for any type of construction. Hansen v. Stroecker, 699 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1985); Harvey v.
Bell, 118 Ky. 512, 81 S.W. 671 (1904); Ewart v. Dalby, 319 Mo. 108, 5 S.W.2d 428 (1928);
Vickers v. Vickers, 205 Tenn. 86, 325 S.W.2d 544 (1959); Johnson v. Painter, 189 Tenn. 307, 225
S.W.2d 72 (1949).
132. Simes & Smith, Future Interests, supra note 16, § 522.
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common law. Some state a preference for a definite failure of issue
construction with successive or substitutional consequences. Some state
statutes are silent and the courts have abolished the common law rule.
In any case, the statute should be consulted before predicting any testa-
tor's intent.' 38
Few testators can foresee the multiple consequences of the phrase
"death without issue." The myriad possibility of life estates, executory
interests, contingent remainders and finally a fee simple complicate the
best intentions of any scrivener seeking to keep any piece of property in
the family for any period of time. Being able to place the words within
the context of the Principle offers some assurance of continuity and
predictability. Being able to identify for the settlor or the testator par-
ticular points in time as events-A, B, or C events-provides the scriv-
ener with a means by which he may best provide for early alienability
or continuity within the family for as long as possible, a safeguarding
of the bloodline.
V. THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
Within American law there are rules far more complicated than
the Rule. Nonetheless, there has developed around the Rule a myth
that it is "alright" to consider the Rule too complicated and too obtuse
to learn."3 4 By countenancing any lesser professional obligation regard-
ing the Rule, the courts or legislators will guarantee that "several more
disappointed beneficiaries and their discredited counsel can point to the
Rule as the cause of their grief." '
There should be no immunity from a proper understanding of the
Rule and methods to draft, remedy, and anticipate it properly. Persons
like John Chipman Gray'36 and W. Barton Leach 37 have written and
133. For a collection of statutes affecting death without issue, see id. § 526 n.25.
134. Scriveners are often negligent in considering the proper use of the Rule, and courts are
reluctant to attribute blame or negligence. For instance, in 1961 the Supreme Court of California
decided that a beneficiary under a will has a cause of action in tort or contract against an attorney
who negligently drafts a will, but violating the Rule Against Perpetuities is not negligence as a
matter of law. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962).
135. Lynn, The Modern Rule Against Perpetuities 2 (1966) [hereinafter Lynn, The Modern
Rule].
136. Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (1886), was first published in 1886 and most re-
cently by his son, Roland, as the fourth edition in 1942; Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th
ed. 1942). This is the seminal treatment of the Rule and it too admits: "There is something in the
subject which seems to facilitate error." Lynn, The Modern Rule, supra note 135, at Xl.
137. Professor Leach has written extensively on the Rule. See, e.g., Morris & Leach, The
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lectured extensively in an effort to make the Rule more understandable
to scriveners and hopefully, to lessen the myth of the Rule as the "tech-
nicality-ridden legal nightmare."1 38 Modern efforts to reform the Rule
have also worked towards this goal.' 39 Since the "complexity of the
common law rule remains despite the modern reforms,"' 40 continual
attempts must be made to delineate the intricacies of the Rule.
The structure of the Principle is one method of delineation, giving
perspective to the common law announcement that no interest is good
unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest.'" Structure is necessary so
that a scrivener may draft what the Rule is meant to accomplish: "to
limit the period of time between the creation of a contingent future
interest and its vesting in interest."'"" Structure is also necessary so
that possibilities can be avoided; only possibilities, not actual occur-
rences can be considered.' 43 While this dependency on possibility has
Rule Against Perpetuities (2d ed. 1962); Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 Harv.
L. Rev. 973 (1965); Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvania!, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1124 (1960); Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1349
(1954); Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 Harv. L. Rev.
721 (1952); Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1329
(1938); Leach, Powers of Sale in Trustees and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 47 Harv. L. Rev.
948 (1934).
138. Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1349 (1954).
139. Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers) § 1.4 (1983); Kurtz, The Iowa
Rule Against Perpetuities-Reform at Last, Restatement Style: Wait and See and Cy Pres, 69
Iowa L. Rev. 705 (1984); Morris & Wade, Perpetuities Reform at Last, 80 L.Q. Rev. 486
(1964); Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1718 (1983).
140. Bergin & Haskell, Preface to Estates, supra note 2, at 180.
141. Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities 191 (4th ed. 1942). Even where there have been
statutory modifications this remains the current rule in the majority of American jurisdictions or
the basis of the modified law.
142. Bergin & Haskell, Preface to Estates, supra note 2, at 180.
143. The fact that all interests will almost certainly vest within the period of the Rule is not
enough. If there is any possibility that any will not, the interest is void. For instance, testatrix may
devise her estate to such of the descendants of A as are living 22 years after the testatrix's death.
Because it is only highly probable and not absolutely certain some person alive at the creation will
be alive after 22 years, the devise is void. Simes, Future Interests, supra note 3, at 265. Many
American jurisdictions strictly apply this construction of "possibility run wild." See Brownell v.
Edmunds, 209 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1953); Larier v. Larier, 218 Ga. 137, 126 S.E.2d 776 (1962);
Monarski v. Greb, 407 111. 281, 95 N.E.2d 433 (1950); Barnhart v. McKinney, 235 Kan. 511, 682
P.2d 112 (1984); In re Freeman's Estate, 195 Kan. 190, 404 P.2d 222 (1965); In re Foster's
Estate, 190 Kan. 498, 376 P.2d 784 (1962); Curtis v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 318 S.W.2d 33
(Ky. 1958); Snyder's Estate v. Denit, 195 Md. 81, 72 A.2d 757 (1950); Nelson v. Mercantile
Trust Co., 335 S.W.2d 167 (Mo. 1960); Tiehen v. Hebenstreit, 152 Neb. 753, 42 N.W.2d 802
(1950); Thomas v. Harrison, 24 Ohio Op. 2d 148, 191 N.E.2d 862 (P. Ct. 1962); In re Pruner's
Estate, 400 Pa. 629, 162 A.2d 626 (1960); In re Yeager's Estate, 354 Pa. 463, 47 A.2d 813
(1946); Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Marey, 86 R.I. 15, 133 A.2d 724 (1957); Love v. Love, 208 S.C.
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led to absurd results,1 44 it has also been the proximate cause of many
statutory changes.145
Recall the structure of the Principle. There are three vertical lines,
each representing an event: (A) date of inter vivos creation or date of
execution of the last will and testament, (B) date of death of the crea-
tor or testator, and (C) date of distribution. There is also a horizontal
shift from left to right representing four time frames surrounding the
three events. These time frames are important because if the future
interest created is vested immediately or may possibly become vested
within any of them, the Rule is affected.
If the scrivener seeks to draft an interest that may become vested
or possessory in the future, the first concern will be the manner in
which the interest is created. The Principle provides a choice: A line if
this is an inter vivos trust, or B line if it is testamentary. 46 Standing at
the proper introductory point is essential because of the possibility of
changes that could occur during any of the time frames after the
proper line. These possibilities result because the scrivener has created
a contingent future interest commencing at a particular point in time
and then, because the contingency may only possibly occur, the interest
may not vest properly. 147 Thus, the contingent interest is void if, "at
the creation of the interest, it appeared that it might not vest within
363, 38 S.E.2d 231 (1946); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 261 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Burruss
v. Baldwin, 199 Va. 883, 103 S.E.2d 249 (1958).
144. Fertile octogenarian conclusive presumptions have voided interests. See Dickerson v.
Union Nat'l Bank, 268 Ark. 292, 595 S.W.2d 677 (1980); Prime v. Hyne, 260 Cal. App. 2d 397,
67 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1968) (status of persons who may not be alive at the time of creation will void
the interest); Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Brody, 174 Conn. 616, 392 A.2d 445 (1978)
(events that could occur more than 21 years after creation are void).
145. A modern suggestion for statutory reform of the Rule Against Perpetuities may be
found in Langbein & Waggoner, Selected Statutes on Trusts and Estates 490-552 (1987) (the
section entitled "Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities" provides suggested statutory re-
form and offers a comprehensive summary of reform proposals and commentary).
146. While a last will and testament may be created at the A line because of proper execu-
tion, it speaks only at the date of death because, "a living person has no heirs." Morsman v.
Commissioner, 90 F.2d 18, 26, 28 (8th Cir. 1937). See also Timberlake v. State-Planters Bank of
Commerce and Trusts, 201 Va. 950, 115 S.E.2d 39 (1960) (will speaks only at death).
147. Remainders are either vested or contingent and "[iut is frequently difficult to determine
what language should be construed to create a vested remainder and what a contingent remain-
der." Simes, Future Interests, supra note 3, at 19. Courts prefer vested remainders. Id. But it is
notable that even when a remainder is vested it can be: (I) indefeasibly vested, (2) vested subject
to open, and (3) vested subject to complete defeasance. Id. at 20. The last alternative, vested
subject to complete defeasance, would occur when A conveys Blackacre "to B for life, remainder
to C and his heirs; but if C does not survive B, then to D and his heirs." C has a vested remainder
subject to complete defeasance. Id. at 24.
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that period."1 8 What actually happens after the possibility at the crea-
tion does not matter; again, only possibility counts. Thus, the point of
creation, be it the A line as with a deed or the B line as with a will, is
the beginning of the structure of the Rule and the Principle." 9
The next stage in the process of deciphering the Rule is for the
scrivener to ask a question. The question is suggested as a supplement
to the familiar recitation of Gray's Rule. The scrivener should ask:
Standing at this point of creation, is there any possibility that any in-
terest will not vest within a life in being plus twenty-one years? The
answer should be no. However, the result will depend on a number of
factors.150 All of these factors can be discussed using the Principle.
First, reconsider the point of creation as a significant event be-
cause it is from here that any inquiry under the Rule must commence.
Identifying the point from which to ask the question of possibility or to
draft an instrument of validity demands a perspective. We have ex-
amined commencement at the A line and the B line if there is a power
of revocation in an inter vivos instrument or a testamentary trust. Even
the C line, a point representing distribution, 5' could initiate com-
mencement under certain circumstances. For instance, under situations
concerning powers of appointment, the validity of the power under the
Rule is determined not from the creation by the donor of the power
during life (A line) or at death (B line), but at the exercise of the
148. Id. at 267-68.
149. As shall be discussed, courts have rationalized reasons and methods of commencing
inquiries concerning the possibility of vesting under the Rule, for example, even though inquiry
concerning vesting under the Rule should commence at the A line for an inter vivos transaction, if
the settler of an inter vivos trust reserves the power to revoke the trust and revest the estate in
himself, inquiries under the Rule commence when the power of revocation ceases, usually the
settlor's death, or the B line. See Cook v. Horn, 214 Ga. 289, 104 S.E.2d 461 (1958); Fitzpatrick
v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 220 Md. 534, 155 A.2d 702 (1959); Dennis Rourke
Corp. v. Ferrero Constr., 64 Md. App. 694, 498 A.2d 689 (1985), cert. granted, 305 Md. 243, 503
A.2d 252 (1986). Additionally, the Wait and See Doctrine and the Second Look Doctrine are
relevant considerations in determining when the Rule commences.
150. While individual factors within the analysis of the Rule seem to contain so many partic-
ular intricacies, it is important to remember that taken together the factors are meant to "curtail
dead hand domination and facilitate marketability" of property. Gulliver, Future Interests, supra
note 1, at 76.
151. The C line as a point of distribution can be seen in an example provided by Professor
Lynn: If A devises to B for life, remainder to that child of B who first attains the age of 25, the C
line would be when the child of B first attains the age at some distant point in time or immedi-
ately upon the death of A. Lynn, The Modern Rule, supra note 135, at 33. If there is no child of
B who is 25 at A's death, the contingent remainder in any child whenever born would be void
because there is a possibility that B could have a child who might attain 25 at a remote time. Id.
at 14.
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power by the donee (C line). 152 While this construction concerns the
exercise of a presently exercisable general power of appointment and
not the more limited special or testamentary general powers, it does
demonstrate the creation potential of a C line.153
Various statutory and judicial constructions can also modify the
time of creation for purposes of the Rule. These include Wait and See,
Cy Pres, and Second Look Doctrines. These should be considered sepa-
rately from the situation of a general presently exercisable power of
appointment. What all have in common is a demand for as-
certainability and perspective.
Second, reconsider the possibility that an interest may not vest.
The contingent remainder and the executory interest are subject to the
Rule, but the possibility of reverter and the right of entry are not. 154
While there are subclassifications of remainders,'55 our major concern
will be when X devises land to Y for life, remainder to Z and his heirs,
if, but only if, Z shall attain the age of twenty-one years. In such an
example Z would have a contingent remainder. It would be vested if
Z's right to possession of the land were not subject to any condition
precedent except the termination of the prior particular estate. 5 1
152. Appeal of Miffin, 121 Pa. 205, 15 A. 525 (1888). This rationale is similar to that in
Cook v. Horn, 214 Ga. 289, 104 S.E.2d 461 (1958). See also In re Estate of McMurtry, 68 Misc.
2d 553, 326 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sur. Ct. 1971); Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Trans-
fers) § 1.2 (1983).
153. The rationale of the creation point in time being C, rather than one based on the do-
nor's transfer or death, is dependent upon the general grant of ownership given to the donee and
hence the loss of control by the donor. The essential difference is that the donee can appoint to
himself or herself at anytime. Of course, any exercise by that donee would be subject to separate
scrutiny under the Rule. See Berger, The Rule Against Perpetuities as It Relates to Powers of
Appointment, 41 Neb. L. Rev. 583 (1962).
154. The historical basis for this distinction can be found in Schaefers v. Apel, 295 Ala. 277,
328 So. 2d 274 (1976); Laurel v. Powers, 366 So. 2d 1079 (Miss. 1979); Restatement (Second) of
Property (Donative Transfers) § 1.4 comment (c) (1983). Stated in the simplest terms, it would
appear that the Rule merged to "check the indiscriminate creation of indestructible contingent
future interests," and this after the enactment of the Statute of Uses and the Statute of Wills.
Lynn, The Modern Rule, supra note 135, at 8.
155. Remainders can be classified into four distinct possibilities: (a) indefeasibly vested; (b)
vested subject to open; (c) vested subject to complete defeasance; and (d) subject to a condition
precedent.
156. A remainder is contingent at the time it is created if at that time the remaindermen are
unborn, or, though born and ascertained, are subject to some express condition other than the
termination of a prior particular estate. For example: A grants to B for life an acre of land,
remainder to C and his heirs if C attains 21. When 13 dies C is 18 and C was only 15 when A
created the interest. Thus, the contingent remainder in C, not having vested before B's death, and
not vesting at the instant of B's death, fails under the destructibility rule. 2A Powell, The Law of
Real Property § 268 (1986); 1 Simes & Smith, Future Interests, supra note 16, § 194.
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An executory interest was made legal by the Statute of Uses and
the Statute of Wills and they created a future interest that will become
a present interest, if at all, in someone other than the creator or his
successors in interest and which cannot satisfy the definition of a re-
mainder. 157 Such distinctions between remainders and executory inter-
ests cause confusion and may no longer be needed. Indeed, some au-
thors advocate eliminating any distinction. 15 8 Even if this were to
happen, there would still exist the problem of such interests being sub-
ject to the Rule and the difficulty of vesting within the prescribed pe-
riod of time.
Vesting must be examined separately from lapse." 9 The latter, be-
ing determined from statutory formulation, is easier to predict. With
vesting, the certainty is gone and the events occurring at the A, B, or C
lines become like racers seeking to cross a finish line or jump a hurdle.
Also, the events occurring before or after the vertical points A, B, and
C become significant. Recall that each of these time frames, numbered
from left to right 1, 2, 3 and 4 contain changes in persons, births, and
deaths, that affect the Rule.
For instance, while vesting is essential for contingent interests
under the Rule, persons signified by class rather than by individual des-
ignation are seldom vested interest holders. Class gifts and the Rule are
problematic. Since the definition of class contains the increase and de-
crease of its members, it is possible that those already in the class may
have a vested interest and those that may come afterwards have void
interests.' 6" Even with this unique feature, the Rule affects the class as
a unit and both the maximum and minimum membership must be de-
termined within the period of the Rule.' 6'
Typical class gifts are to children, issue, brothers and sisters, neph-
ews and nieces, and grandchildren. It is group minded. This lack of
definiteness causes problems under the Rule. For instance, if A devises
157. Be they shifting or springing executory interests, the essential difference between a re-
mainder and an executory interest involves a person other than the creator and the interest cannot
be defined as a remainder. See Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers) § 1.4
comments b, m (1983). Professor Simes would add that it is never vested, it is unlike a reversion,
it is conditional, and it almost always terminates another vested interest. Simes, Future Interests,
supra note 3, at 16-25.
158. See Dukeminier, Contingent Remainders and Executory Interests: A Requiem for the
Distinction, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 13 (1959).
159. For a discussion of lapse, see supra part 11 of text.
160. Simes, Future Interests, supra note 3, at 289.
161. Id. This construction is usually stated as the "All or Nothing" rule of Leake v. Robin-
son, 2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817).
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to B for life, remainder to such of the children of B as attain twenty-
five, and children of B means whenever born, the class gift is void
under the Rule. Since B could have a child after A's death (the crea-
tion line) and less than four years before B himself dies, said after-born
child of B could reach twenty-five (the C line) later than twenty-one
years after B's death. It is possible, and with a male, especially with
adoption, and in jurisdictions believing in "fertile octogenerians." Even
though B could have some children who would qualify to take under
the devise, since some could not, the entire devise falls as a unit.162
In the previous example, the interest in B's children was created at
A's death, the effective date of the last will and testament. If the inter-
est had been created during the life of A, the time of creation would
have shifted from the B line to the A line and it is even more probable
that the interest would have violated the Rule. Why? Because B would
have been younger, capable of having more children, and more subject
to the presumption of fertility, even in males.1 63 The periods of time
with which we would have been concerned would have been 2 and 3, or
that period from creation until the last child of B reaches twenty-five,
the C line.
Vesting is a nebulous task at best and with the expansive nature of
class gifts it is easy to see why legislators and judges would seek to find
an amelioration of any harsh results. Some judges have looked to an
intent expressed by the instrument. Such an intent could safeguard the
interest created."' And of course there are legislative remedies such as
Wait and See and Second Look.160 For the student, the scrivener, and
162. Lynn, The Modern Rule, supra note 135, at 91. There are statutory and judicial excep-
tions to the harsh effects of this result. See Simes, Future Interest, supra note 3, at 292, and
discussion of Cy Pres, Wait and See, and intent necessary to split a class.
163. Either through judicial construction or statute, more states are allowing rebuttal of the
presumption of male fertility. See In re Bassett Estate, 104 N.H. 504, 190 A.2d 415 (1963); In re
Scott's Trust, 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 66 (1955); Kelby Estate, 80 Pa. D. & C. I (1952); Frost Nat'l
Bank v. Newton, 554 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. 1977).
164. Chase Nat'l Bank v. Gutherie, 139 Conn. 178, 90 A.2d 643 (1952); In re Estate of
Florey, 212 Neb. 665, 325 N.W.2d 643 (1982); Wehrer v. Baker, 161 Neb. 241, 72 N.W.2d 844
(1955); DeSanto v. Haug, 65 N.J. Super. 206, 167 A.2d 428 (1961); In re Estate of Valiquette,
122 Vt. 350, 173 A.2d 839 (1961).
165. Both reform doctrines are identical in that each allows courts to consider actualities
rather than possibilities; courts are able to move into the future (actualities), rather than consider
the possibilities. Nonetheless, Wait and See is associated with standard Rule construction and
Second Look with powers of appointment. Professor Simes offers no distinction when he incorpo-
rates the case associated with Second Look (Sears v. Coolidge) into the two cases "commonly
cited as supporting the Wait and See doctrine in the absence of statute." L.M. Simes, supra note
3, at 273.
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the appropriate authority, however, the issue is what to do about vest-
ing problems and the Rule when applied to class gifts. Clearly if there
is an increase of class in areas 2 and 3 because an inter vivos interest is
created, or only area 3, because it is testamentary, there are possibili-
ties of violation of the Rule. This is not to confuse the situation of a
decrease in class and the heirs of the deceased class member seeking to
share through the decedent because of vesting. Increase and decrease of
class can cause problems for vesting, but the Rule focuses on the possi-
bility of increase."
In addition, we should reconsider the vesting at twenty-one years
after some life in being. But life in being when? The answer directs us
to the time of creation and our selection of the appropriate person or
persons at that time. If the interest is created inter vivos, inquiry under
the Rule should begin at the A line-unless of course it is a revocable
trust, general inter vivos power of appointment, or a jurisdiction with
statutory reforms. 1 7 When the life in being must actually exist differs
to the extent that the common law Rule or the statutory reforms pro-
vide. It is conceivable that any of three time events may be the starting
point: the A line as the inter vivos creation, the B line as the testamen-
tary commencement, and the C line as the point of distribution or exer-
cise by the donee of an inter vivos power of appointment.
Once the time event is determined, the human lives in being'68
must be ascertained from among persons living or in gestation about
whom we can say: "Whatever may occur, we know the interest must
vest, if it vests at all, not later than twenty-one years after the death of
all these persons."'1 69 The lives need not be mentioned in the instru-
ment; 70 they can be determined through implication, 17 but they must
166. Because class gifts often involve family members and because they have a listing of
specialty constructions-lapse, survivorship, and vesting being examples-it should not be surpris-
ing that constructional preferences surround class gifts. Nonetheless, the scrivener should adopt an
attitude of attention to detail and the settlor "should adopt a critical attitude and determine for
himself whether the conclusions are reasonable inferences or merely fossilized legalisms." Bergin
& Haskell, Preface to Estates, supra note 2, at 138-39.
167. The three most discussed statutory reforms are (I) Wait and See, (2) Second Look, and
(3) Cy Pres. They do not guarantee vesting, but they do allow for inquiry as to certainty of vesting
to begin at a different point in time. For a discussion of these reforms, see infra part VI.
168. Only human lives may be considered; neither animals nor corporations may be consid-
ered. In re Howells' Estate, 145 Misc. 557, 260 N.Y.S. 598 (Sur. Ct. 1932). See also Fitchie v.
Brown, 211 U.S. 321 (1908).
169. Simes, Future Interests, supra note 3, at 265.
170. 6 American Law of Property § 24:13 (1952); 5 Powell, The Law of Real Property §
766(4) (1986); 3 Simes & Smith, Future Interests, supra note 16, § 1223.
171. An example of determining measuring lives by implication is given by Professor Simes:
19881
GEO. MASON U. L. REVIEW
be neither so numerous nor so situated that evidence of their deaths is
likely to be unreasonably difficult to obtain.172 The lives must also come
prior to the period of twenty-one years,'178 although this would be an
opportunity for legislators to make another statutory concession to
reform.
More than likely, the life in being will be a life tenant or life in-
come beneficiary, the donee of a contingent gift, all the members of a
class who may be alive at a designated time, or in the case of a general
testamentary or special power of appointment, the donee could be the
measuring life. 174 Today, with the advent of statutory reform, a princi-
ple of causality affects the choice of the measuring lives. Professor
Jesse Dukeminier incorporates this when he writes:
At common law the measuring lives had to have a causal relationship to vest-
ing which insured vesting within the period. Under wait-and-see, absolute cer-
tainty ab initio is not required, and hence the measuring lives are those in
being at the beginning of the period whose continuance might affect vesting.
These are lives which "play a part in the ultimate disposition of the prop-
erty"; these are lives with a causal relationship to vesting.'"
Vesting, measuring lives, and time of creation are all focal points
in any inquiry under the Rule. But with the advent of reform, the scriv-
ener is not only more aware of alternatives but also more likely to draft
an instrument which does not reflect the intent of the client. There was
certainty and security in strict interpretation of rules. Also, with the
complexity of inter vivos and testamentary constructions, longer life ex-
pectancies, and increased use of will substitutes in drafting, financial
risks are more significant. Add to this expansion of doctrines of powers,
class gifts, lapse and simultaneous death, and the tendency to fall vic-
X devises all his estate to such of his grandchildren as attain 21. The children of X are the
implied measuring lives. De Ford v. Coleman, 348 Mass. 299, 203 N.E.2d 686 (1965); B.M.C.
Durfee Trust Co. v. Taylor, 325 Mass. 201, 89 N.E.2d 777 (1950); Boone v. Stone, 142 S.W.2d
936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Otterback v. Bohrer, 87 Va. 548, 12 S.E. 1013 (1891).
172. Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers) §§ 1.2, 1.3 (1983). Because of
advances made in comparative and federal programs such as the personal locator service of the
Social Security Administration, it is less likely that notice of deaths would be unreasonably diffi-
cult to obtain. Thus a manner by which the maximum period under the Rule may be obtained
could be to define the lives in being as all those babies, born on the date of creation, at any
designated hospital or hospitals.
173. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Tiffany, 202 Ky. 618, 260 S.W. 357 (1924); Thomas
v. Harrison, 24 Ohio Op. 2d 148, 191 N.E.2d 862 (P. Ct. 1962).
174. Possibilities as to the measuring life are listed in Lynn, The Modern Rule, supra note
135, at 43-47.
175. Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1648, 1657 n.26
(1985) (quoting Dukeminier, Kentucky Perpetuities Law Restated and Reformed, 49 Ky. L.J. 3,
63 (1960)).
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tim to death without issue, and the scrivener will need perspective and
parameters. Drawing upon public policy and even history, the Rule re-
stricts "[c]logs upon the Estate,"1 6 threat from family dynasties, 17
and the familiar complaint of dead hand control. But the Rule should
never be reduced, or raised, to the level of topic for a debate. It is a
device for construction and achieves its status only insofar as it furthers
the objectives of the scrivener in his or her drafting of intent.
The modern scrivener must be concerned over drafting, the proper
use of class, issue, and powers. Time periods and events within those
periods must be identified properly as to exercise, identification, contin-
gencies, and of course vesting. The Analytical Principle is a tool for the
scrivener, be it interpreting the strict applications of the past or the
modern reforms present today.
VI. MODERN REFORM AND THE ANALYTICAL PRINCIPLE
A common complaint of persons who think they have been victim-
ized by the law is that it never would have happened if they could have
afforded a better attorney. There is no certainty that a more expensive
attorney would be better, but such complaints cause some to think of
the Rule as "rich men's law. 1 78 In an effort to avoid such complaints,
three basic reform measures have been advocated or adopted by many
jurisdictions: Wait and See, Cy Pres, and specific repairs for specific
problems.179 All accept the Rule and its purpose, but they seek to fol-
low the spirit of many ecclesiastical decisions as balancing "the interest
of property owners in disposing of property in a manner of their own
choosing and the interest of living beneficiaries in utilizing that prop-
erty in whatever manner they determine most beneficial in light of pre-
sent facts and circumstances. 1 80
176. The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 31, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 949 (1682).
177. Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 Harv. L.
Rev. 727 (1952). Contra Fetters, Perpetuities: The Wait and See Disaster-A Brief Reply to
Professor Maudsley, With a Few Asides to Professors Leach, Simes, Wade, Dr. Morris, et al., 60
Cornell L. Rev. 380 (1975).
178. Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1329,
1353 (1938).
179. The District of Columbia has resisted all reform efforts. The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia has held that the common law rule applies and any change
must be accomplished by statute. American Sec. & Trust Co. v. Cramer, 175 F. Supp. 367
(D.D.C. 1959). Some courts adopt reforms only because the questioned interest had vested in fact
within the perpetuity period. See Sears v. Coolidge, 329 Mass. 340, 108 N.E.2d 563 (1952);
Phelps v. Shropshire, 254 Miss. 777, 183 So. 2d 158 (1966); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98
N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953).
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American efforts at reform of the Rule can be characterized as
gentle in effect and polite in application. Some say the American stat-
utes "tend to be short and all-encompassing."1' By contrast, the En-
glish Perpetuities and Accumulations Act of 1964182 has fifteen sec-
tions, directly addressing the fertile octogenarians, unborn widows, and
the all or nothing rule concerning class gifts. The American and British
approaches are different, but the former's present contributions are still
significant as reform is sure to continue with the advent of new biology
and increased inter vivos arrangements.
Wait and See approaches were not adopted in the United States
by statute until Pennsylvania did so in 1947.183 Today, less than half of
the states and the Restatement (Second) of Property have adopted the
doctrine,"8 4 by statute or judicial decision. All would insist that the es-
sential contribution of Wait and See is to change the possibilities ap-
proach of the orthodox rule into an actualities test. In other words, to
"wait and see" what actually happens, rather than to void the interest
ab initio because of the possibilities that could occur.
Some states have combined this Wait and See approach with Cy
Pres, another doctrine which allows the court to recast the dispositive
provisions in such a way as to best comply with the creator's intent and
still vest properly.1 85 In 1962 Kentucky passed a statute providing:
In determining whether an interest would violate the rule against perpetuities
the period of perpetuities shall be measured by actual rather than possible
events; provided, however, the period shall not be measured by any lives
whose continuance does not have a causal relationship to the vesting or failure
of the interest. Any interest which would violate said rule as thus modified
shall be reformed, within the limits of that rule, to approximate most closely
the intention of the creator of the interest.'8 6
180. Kurtz, The Iowa Rule Against Perpetuities-Reform at Last, Restatement Style: Wait-
and-See and Cy Pres, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 705, 707 (1984).
181. Lynn, The Modern Rule, supra note 135, at 116.
182. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, ch. 55.
183. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 6104 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
184. See Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers) § 1.4 note (1983) for a list
of those States which have adopted the Wait and See Doctrine. The American Law Institute
(ALI) adopted the Wait and See Doctrine because the "what might happen" approach is nothing
more than a trap that is easily avoided by appropriate drafting. The validity of all non-vested
interests should be on the same plane whether the interest is created by a skilled draftsman or one
not so skilled.
185. Browder, Construction, Reformation, and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 62 Mich. L.
Rev. 1 (1963); Leach, Perpetuities: Cy Pres on the March, 17 Vand. L. Rev. 1381 (1964). The
advantage of Cy Pres is that it provides for immediate resolution of the problem and eliminates
the need to wait and see.
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While a statute seems the better approach, New Hampshire
adopted both doctrines by judicial decision,8 and a number of states
have modified versions of Wait and See and Cy Pres. 188 Even though
more than half of the states still follow the orthodox rule with no modi-
fication, the trend is certainly toward actualities and predominant in-
tent, 89 with suggestions to impose a fixed term of years and vesting in
possession rather than interest. The intent is to simplify the Rule with-
out any compromise of its socio-economic purposes.1 9
Discussion concerning the Principle should concentrate upon Wait
and See or Cy Pres as these are the major reform measures. Others are
alternatives with similar results' 9' or specific repairs.'92 None of the
major reforms abolishes the Rule. Rather, it is in reference to actuali-
ties instead of possibilities that a difference is made; it is in reference to
a different point of creation that determinations are made; and finally,
it is in reference to the general intent of the creator that dispositions
are made. Thus, since the Principle establishes three separate reference
points-creation, death, and disposition-the doctrines should be de-
scribed as moving precisely from A to B in an inter vivos disposition
regardless of any power of revocation in the creator,9 3 or a movement
186. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 381.216 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1970). See Dukeminier, Ken-
tucky Perpetuities Law Restated and Reformed, 49 Ky. L.J. 3 (1960); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 27, §
501 (1975).
187. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953); Leach, Perpetu-
ities: New Hampshire Defertilizes the Octogenarians, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 279 (1963).
188. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 45-95, -96 (West 1958); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, §§ 101,
102 (1964); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 184A, §§ I, 2 (West 1977); Wash. Rev. Code § 11.98.130
(1987); Idaho Code § 55-111 (1979).
189. See generally Lynn, Perpetuities Reform: An Analysis of Developments in England and
the United States, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 508 (1965). Reform is often prompted by the threat of
malpractice. See Millwright v. Romer, 322 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1982), and subsequent adoption of
Iowa Code Ann. § 558.68 (West 1987).
190. Bergin & Haskell, Preface to Estates, supra note 2, at 228-29.
191. The Second Look Doctrine applies to powers of appointment and specifically to special
and general testamentary powers which would result in a void interest if they are capable of being
exercised beyond the period of the Rule. The doctrine allows us to wait until the power is exer-
cised before determining the validity of the appointed interest and then to decide on validity based
on exercise rather than creation. Warner v. Whitman, 353 Mass. 468, 233 N.E.2d 14 (1968);
Sears v. Coolidge, 329 Mass. 340, 108 N.E.2d 563 (1952); Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51
Harv. L, Rev. 638 (1938).
192. There are numerous specific repair attempts by statute and judicial determination. They
include fertile octogenarian cases, administrative contingencies, and age contingencies in excess of
21 years. The English statutes make these specific repairs in one statute. See Perpetuities and
Accumulations Act, 1964, ch. 55; Perpetuities Act of 1966, N. Ir. Pub. Gen. Acts, ch. 2, § 3.
193. Contra Cook v. Horn, 214 Ga. 289, 104 S.E.2d 461 (1958) (a power of revocation
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from A to C when a second look is required to find validity under a
power of appointment created at the A event but not exercised until
after the death of the donor, at the point of death of the donee.
Because reform in the United States has not been captured in one
specific piece of legislation, any statutory or judicial reformation may
appear disjunctive and perhaps be misapplied or neglected. If the Prin-
ciple serves as a vehicle for assembling all of the reform measures it
will be an effective part of the scrivener's professional responsibility to
his or her client. Furthermore, as the new biology presents more chal-
lenges to Gray's classic rule against perpetuities, the Principle shall
provide the perspective for growth.
CONCLUSION
Transfer of wealth has changed in the United States. International
estate planning, inter vivos arrangements, substantial compliance, and
new biological possibilities for persons have placed added demands
upon scriveners and clients. But the same standard applies today as it
has throughout history. That is, the scrivener owes a professional re-
sponsibility to his or her client that demands clarity and precise utiliza-
tion of all existing and future legal formulations. The task is compli-
cated. The Principle does not change any of the rules or formulations,
but does provide a logical approach towards them.
Doctrines such as lapse, survivorship, death without issue, and the
Rule have developed separately and at the same time collectively. Each
can be studied and defined, along with the auxiliary rules and modifica-
tions. The Principle does not seek to add to these, nor is it a further
explanation of any one of them. The Principle is a perspective, an ap-
proach by which all of them can be schematically presented. Finally,
by directing the scrivener and the client through four time frames and
identifying three distinct events, the Principle seeks to clarify language
and allow for direction. The Principle is a tool for greater professional
responsibility and another attempt to further illuminate old rules so
that understanding might begin "burning anew among the old
stones."' 14
caused the movement from inter vivos creation to death of the creator).
194. E. Waugh, Brideshead Revisited 351 (1945).
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